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THE COST OF DEVELOPING AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING: AT WHAT PRICE? 
JONATHAN DOUGLAS \VnTEN* 
Abstract: It is not disputed that many of the nation's cities, towns, and 
tribal reservations, and their current or would be residents, are facing 
an affordable housing crisis. At issue is how municipal governments-
the leyel of government within which housing gets built-can solve this 
crisis without exacerbating existing problems or creating new ones. This 
Article recommends the affordable housing problem be solYed through 
a combination of time- and judicially-tested options and burden-sharing 
arrangements with the private sector, most notably through mandatory 
inclusionary-zoning requirements and the imposition of impact fees. It 
presents a critique of the approach taken by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts in its pursuit of affordable housing development. The Ar-
ticle recommends that states considering the Massachusetts "cram-
dO\\1.1" methodology avoid the draconian and regressive tactics em-
ployed by the Massachusetts affordable housing statute. Rather, they 
should look to successful affordable housing programs employed by 
"plan states." 
Housing is a ncccssary of lifc.! 
Thc Duc Proccss Clausc was intcndcd to sccurc an individual from all 
abusc of powcr by govcrnmcnt officials.2 
{Duc proccss} claims should, howcvcl; bc limitcd to thc truly irrational-for 
cxamplc, a zoning board's dccision madc by flipping a coin, ccrtainly an 
cfficicnt mcthod of dccisio1l1llaking, but onc bcaring no rclationship what-
cvcr to thc merits of thc pcnding 1IlattCl:3 
* Adjunct Professor, Boston College Law School; Lecturer, Tufts University Depart-
ment of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning; Partner, Daley & Witten, L.L.C.; 
J.D., Suffolk University Law School, 1997; M.R.P., Cornell University, 1981; B.A., Boston 
College, 1979. 
I Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1920). 
~ Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 327 (1986). 
3 Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The development of land, the rules governing land development, 
and the process undertaken in both instances is, and has always been, 
peppered with hostility, resentment, accusations of wrongdoing, and 
distrust of individual motives.4 This is also the case with the develop-
ment of affordable honsing.5 
Although opposition to affordable housing developments histori-
cally has been associated with racial animus, expressed both overtlf 
4 SeeJOEL GARREAU, EDGE CI1Y 11 (1991). Garreau poignantly illustrates the tension 
between preservation and development: 
Id. 
The forces of change whose emblem is the bulldozer, and the forces of pres-
en'ation whose totem is the tree, are everywhere at war in this country. The 
raging debate over what we ha\'e lost and what we have gained, as we flee the 
old urban patterns of the nineteenth century for the new ones of the twenty-
first, is constan t. 
5 See, e.g., ViiI. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926). The Supreme 
Court in Euclid made reference to certain prejudices common in affordable housing de-
bates: 
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the de-
velopment of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of 
apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire sec-
tion for private house purposes; that in such sections very often the apart-
ment house is a mere parasite .... 
Id.; Editorial, Snob Zoning /ilert, Bos'IDN GLOBE, May 18, 2001, at A22 ("'If we went by cur-
rent zoning and bowed to the neighbors every time, we would have no affordable housing 
outside major cities.'"(quoting Aaron Gornstein, Director, Citizens Housing & Planning 
Association)) . 
6 See, e.g., Jon c. Dubin, From jUllkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective 
Zoning ill Low Income Communities of CoI01; 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 773-74 (1993); Stanley P. 
Stocker-Edwards, Black Housing 1860-1980: The Development, Pelpetllation and Attcmpts to 
Eradicate thc Dual Housing Market in ilmerica, 5 HARV. BLACKLETIER LJ. 50, 58 (1988). Ra-
cism was a significant problem in early public housing projects: 
[Il n the 1940s in San Diego, the federal Public Housing Authority (PHA) 
adopted a segregated pattern for its federally managed projects, while many 
areas of the city were integrated .... An example of the role that race could 
play in the politics of location is the city of Chicago in the later 1940s and 
early 1950s. During this period, the majority of the city's aldermen favored 
the principle of public housing; however, the aldermen did not want public 
housing in their own wards. They wanted no low-income neighbors, and no 
Blacks of any kind. 
Stocker-Edwards, supra, at 58. Other commentators provide additional examples of the 
effects of overt racism in housing: 
The historic and continuing practices of officially sanctioned zoning and land 
use discrimination are perhaps most pervasive and well-documented as they 
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and subtly,7 this Article critiques a particular means of developing af-
fordable housing as violative of fundamental due process protections 
and COl1UllOn sense.s 
This critique is not directed at the fact that the affordable hous-
ing units have been constructed or the fact that the structures are oc-
cupied by needy residents. This Article does not contend that afford-
able housing development has any impact, positive or negative, on 
abutting or municipal property values.9 Thus, this article does not 
criticize the "end result." 
pertain to Mrican-American communities .... Nevertheless, other communi-
ties of color-in particular, Puerto Rican and Mexican-American communi-
ties (hereinafter Hispanics)-have similarly experienced substantial govern-
mental discrimination .... Public housing site and tenant selection and 
urban renewal policy have also served to confine hispanics to segregated and 
inferior housing. 
Dubin, supra, at 773-74. Overt racism was also substantive part of the marketing employed 
by one of the nation's largest housing developers, William Levitt, the designer and builder 
of Levittown on Long Island, New York. The original Levittown contract read, "No dwell-
ing shall be used or occupied except by members of the Caucasian race, but the employ-
ment and maintenance of other than Caucasian domestic servants shall be permitted." Jay 
B. Itkowitz, Levittow1l at 25: Prototype of Suburban Housing, at http://www.itkowitz.com/ 
mamI965text.php?aid=259 (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
7 Sec RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 31 (1969) ("The resident of suburbia is 
concerned not with what but with whom. His overriding motivation is less economic than it 
is social. His wife spends more at the hairdresser in a month than the proposed apartment 
house will add to her husband's tax bill in a year."). 
8 Opponents to affordable housing developments are commonly referred to as NIM-
BYs (not in my backyard). "Most of the mechanisms citizens use to influence land devel-
opment are local, just as most decisions affecting land development and housing afforda-
bility are local. Hence, a particular symbiosis exists between NIMBY sentiments and the 
institutionalization of NIMBi:" ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORD-
ABLE Hous., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., NOT IN My BACK YARD 1-7 (1991) 
[hereinafter ADVISORY COMM'N REPORT]. Bllt if prh'ate property owners do not protect 
"their backyard" from development projects that were neither foreseeable nor in accor-
dance with the city or town's long range plan, then who will? The use of the phrase NIMBY 
seeks to chill otherwise lawful and expected opposition to ill-conceived and threatening 
developments by casting less than honorable motives upon the objector. One cannot be 
considered a NIMBY to developments that have an unconstitutional foundation and abuse 
the public's trust. Tim Iglesias, Managi1lg Local Opposition to A.ffol'dable Housing: A New Ap-
proach to NIMBY, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNI'IY DEV. L. 78, 79 n.5 (2002) 
("This article uses the term 'local opposition' instead of NIMBY because NIMBY has be-
come a pejorative term that can undermine efforts to reduce opposition and to build 
community support by unnecessarily offending reasonable individuals who have sincere 
concerns and questions."). 
9 Many commentators argue that studies used to quantify the impact low- and moder-
ate-income housing has on nearby property values are imprecise. Sec, e.g., RICHARD K. 
GREEN, ET AL., UNIV. OF WIS., Low INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT HOUSING DEVELOP-
MENTS AND PROPERTY VALUES 7 (2002) ("The great difficulty in doing such a study well is 
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Rather, this Article argues that the means of producing afford-
able housing is as important as the resulting housing itself. To ensure 
an equitable result-to guarantee that the ends do justifY the means-
a municipal comprehensive plan and regulations consistent with that 
plan must guide the development of affordable housing. 
A successful affordable housing program is, by definition, one 
that is consistent with the city or town or regional plan for growth and 
development. 10 An unsuccessful affordable housing program-best 
exemplified by that found in Massachusetts-is one that has no foun-
dation in a plan or in planning principles. l1 The result is that al-
though the program may facilitate the construction of affordable 
housing units, its reliance upon an "ends justifies the means" meth-
odology violates due process,12 ignores so-called "smart growth" prin-
ciples,13 and clouds an otherwise clear and addressable problem-the 
need for more housing at sub-market prices.14 
in finding otherwise nearly identical units and neighborhoods to compare, that differ 
more or less only in whether developmen ts exist nearby."). Other commen tators, however, 
have noted that quantification is useful. See, e.g., Justin D. Cummins, Housing IHatters: Why 
Our Communities Must Have Affordable Housing, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 197, 212 (2001) 
("Data collected over the past four decades from across the country, and in the metro area, 
shows affordable housing has little, if any, negative impact on surrounding property val-
ues."). As discussed throughout this Article, however, the impact of low- and moderate-
income housing on surrounding land values is relevant only insofar as it relates to the de-
velopment of the municipal comprehensive plan. 
10 See discussion infra Part IV. 
II The Massachusetts approach to affordable housing development fosters an "ends 
justifies the means" approach. See discussion infra Part III. The relevant statute and regula-
tions mandate that where a city or town does not have a requisite number of dwelling units 
defined as subsidized, an applicant proposing to build twenty-five percent of a project's 
dwelling units as "affordable" can override all local rules and regulations. Id. 
12 See discussion infra Part III.B; see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT Of 
VENICE act 3, sc. 2 (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1994) (1600). In the words of William 
Shakespeare: 
The world is still deceived with ornament./ In law, what plea so tainted and 
corrupt.! But being seasoned with a gracious voice,/ Obscures the show of 
evil? / In religion, What damned error, but some sober brow/ Will bless it and 
approve it with a text.! Hiding the grossness with fair ornament? / .... The 
seeming truth which cunning times put on to entrap the wisest. 
Id. act 3, sc. 2, 74-80, 100. 
13 KAREN FINUCAN ET AL., ~1. PLANNING AsS'N, PLANNING fOR SMART GROWTH: 2002 
STATE OF TIlE STATES 22-23 (2002) ("Provisions in Massachusetts' current planning stat-
utes would allow plans for new development to circumvent smart growth measures by ... 
allowing construction of affordable housing in unsuitable locations through a 'compre-
hensiw permit' which effectively bypasses local planning and zoning requirements."). 
14 See discussion infra Part III. 
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This Article analyzes Massachusetts's Comprehensive Permit 
Statute, chapter 40B (Comprehensive Permit Statute or 40B), the na-
tion's leading "ends justifies the means" statute, and proposes a more 
progressive, defensible, and likely, more successful process for devel-
oping affordable housing not just in Massachusetts, but nationwide,15 
Countless examples exist of statewide solutions to affordable housing 
development that link the need for affordable housing with other 
critical municipal concerns. These approaches respect due process 
guarantees and the logic of comprehensive plans and planning. 
I. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN: 
INTEGRATING, NOT ISOLATING, MUNICIPAL PLANNING CONCERNS 
It has long been recognized that a plan-a comprehensive plan 
or a master plan-provides state, regional, and municipal govern-
ments with a rational and predictable plan for growth, development, 
and resource allocation. 16 The plan becomes the blueprint or, in Cali-
fornia, the constitution, for land use and land developmentP In true 
"plan states," regulatory enactments not in accord with the compre-
hensive plan are void ab initio.ls Thus, in a plan state, a city or town 
adopts a comprehensive plan consistent with either a state or regional 
plan (or both), and then tailors its regulatory program around the 
15 Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, 1969 Mass. Acts. 7I 2 (codified as amended 
at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2000». 
16 The recognition that planning and zoning are, or should be, inexorably linked, 
dates back to the Standard Zoning Enabling Act and the Standard City Planning Enabling 
Act published by the United States Department of Commerce in 1926 and 1928, respec-
tively. See A STANDARD Cny PLANNING ENABLING ACT (Advisory Comm. on City Planning 
& Zoning, U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928); STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't 
of Commerce rev., 1926); see also Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (N.Y 1968) 
("[T]he comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be no rational 
allocation of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is being served and that 
zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll."). 
17 See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., The Comprehensive Plan as Constitution: General Lessons from Re-
cent California Zoning Initiative Cases, in 1992 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 463 
(Kenneth H. Young ed., 1991). 
18 deBottari v. City Council, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790, 795 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Forestview 
Homemvner's Ass'n. v. Cook County, 309 N.E.2d 763, 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Raabe v. City 
of Walker, 174 N.W.2d 789, 796 (Mich. 1970); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Las Vegas, 
622 P.2d 695, 698 (N.M. 1980). 
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plan and the principles contained in the plan.19 The adopted regula-
tions follow, and are consistent with, the plan.2o 
States that do not require planning consistency or linkage be-
tween regulatory enactments and an adopted plan could, for lack of a 
better term, be labeled "non-plan" states. Non-plan states rely on tra-
ditional rational basis presumptions to defend (or arguably excuse) 
local government actions. Thus, for example, the success of a chal-
lenge to a downzoning in a non-plan state is dependant upon the 
plaintiff demonstrating that the city's or town's action was arbitrary; a 
difficult hurdle given that there are no benchmarks for guiding the 
court's adjudication. 
Consider the following hypothetical: the City of Jamesville is an 
incorporated municipality in a state with no comprehensive planning 
requirements. The state has enabled cities and towns to adopt zoning 
and traditional police power controls to protect public health, safety, 
and welfare. Jamesville recently adjusted its zoning ordinance to pro-
hibit multifamily structures and require a minimum lot size of two 
acres for every single-family residential structure. Jamesville has 
adopted, many would argue, a zoning ordinance that is both exclu-
sionary and orchestrated to erect "barriers" to moderate-income 
housing development. 
A statewide nonprofit organization files for declaratory judgment 
claiming that Jamesville's ordinance is exclusionary. The claim is a 
facial challenge21 and includes the argument that the City's actions 
were ultra vires, arbitrary, and de facto exclusionary. Bowing to tradi-
19 deRottari, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 795; see also Forestview Homeowller's Ass '11, 309 N .E.2d at 772; 
Raabe, 174 N.w'2d at 796; Rd. ofCollnty C011!m 'n, 622 P.2d at 698. 
20 See Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 
1990) ("The Planning and Zoning Law does not contemplate that general plans will be 
amended to conform to zoning ordinances. The tail does not wag the dog. "); see also Nova 
Horizon, Inc. v. City Council of Reno, 769 P.2d 721, 724 (Nev. 1989). The Supreme Court 
of Nevada reinforced the fact that judicial deference cannot be equated with judicial abdi-
cation: 
Having determined that master plans are to be accorded substantial compli-
ance under Nevada's statutory scheme, and recognizing anew the general re-
luctance to judicially intervene in zoning determinations absent clear neces-
sity .... It is clear on the record that no eviden tiary basis exists for the 
Council's denial of appellants' zone change request. 
Nova Horizon, 769 P.2d at 724. 
21 A facial challenge to a zoning or other land use regulation is a challenge brought to 
the regulation in the abstract, even though the regulation has not yet been "applied" to 
the plaintiff's land. An "as applied" challenge attacks the regulation as it relates to the 
plaintiff's specific property or development proposal. 
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tional principles of judicial deference to legislative22 and adjudica-
tive23 actions, the likely outcome of a reviewing court, applying a ra-
tional basis standard of review,24 will be for the defendant-City. This 
outcome will likely occur despite the possibility that the two-acre zon-
ing may in fact be exclusionary. 
In its review, the court may demand some evidence that a two-
acre minimum lot size and a prohibition on multifamily housing are 
necessary to fulfill the City's police power objectives.25 However, ab-
sent a clear indication that the City violated equal protection26 or 
22 In reviewing a government's exercise of the police powers, the court's analysis rests 
upon the presumption that a legislative body-state or local-is in a better position to 
assess the propriety of the action. See, e.g., ViII. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 
388 (1926); Nat'l Land & 1m. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A,2d 597, 613-14 (Pa. 1965) (Cohen,]., 
dissenting). If there is a rational basis for the legislative action, then the judiciary will defer 
to the legislature and uphold the regulation. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. When a land use regu-
lation's reasonableness is "fairly debatable," it will be upheld. Id.; see also Carty v. City of 
Ojai, 143 Cal. Rptr. 506, 508 n.l (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1978) ("'As applied to the case at 
hand, the function of this court is to determine whether the record shows a reasonable 
basis for the action of the zoning authorities, and, if the reasonableness of the ordinance is 
fairly debatable, the legislati\'e determination will not be disturbed.'" (quoting Lockard v. 
City of Los Angeles, 202 P.2d 38, 43 (Cal. 1949))); Johnson v. Town of Edgartown, 680 
N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 1997) ("The general rule is that a zoning by-law whose reasonable-
ness is fairly debatable will be sustained .... [T]he challenger must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the zoning regulation is arbitrary and unreasonable, or substan-
tially unrelated to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare."). 
23 See, e.g., Pendergast v. Bd. of Appeals of Barnstable, 120 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Mass. 
1954). 
/d. 
Zoning has always been treated as a local matter. The creation and 
modification of zones are matters of municipal legislation. The board of ap-
peals is a local board familiar with local conditions ... , A judge of a State 
wide court, perhaps spending only a few days or weeks in a particular locality, 
is hardly a suitable tribunal for such purposes. 
24 See, e.g., Arneson v. State, 864 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Mont. 1993). 
25 See ViII. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) 
("In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the concurrent findings of both 
courts below. Respondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discrimina-
tory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village'S decision."). 
26 Id. The Supreme Court in Arlington Heights noted that evidence of a racially dis-
criminatory motivation does not end the inquiry: 
Proof that the decision was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory pur-
pose would not necessarily have required the itwalidation of the challenged 
decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden 
of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the im-
permissible purpose not been considered. 
/d. at 270-71 n.2l. 
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some other state constitutional guarantee,27 the challenge will fail and 
the ordinance will be upheld. 
The fact that Jamesville's rezoning efforts will succeed highlights 
both the inherent problem lurking within non-plan states as well as 
the irrationality of forcing non-plan states to succumb to legislative or 
judicial punishment for the failure of their respective cities and towns 
to respond properly to legislative mandates. This is land use law's 
most notorious Catch-22. 
By virtue of the fact that the state has not adopted statewide 
planning or consistency requirements, cities and towns are arguably 
free to enact any regulation that is not preempted by or inconsistent 
with state or federal law. This laissez faire approach may work, unless 
and until the state concludes that issues of statewide importance are 
being overlooked and therefore require remedial action. Thus, in a 
non-plan state, needs of statewide importance-affordable housing, 
power plants, telecommunication facilities, and others that transcend 
traditional municipal boundaries-are difficult to address. There is 
no effective mechanism to encourage cities and towns to "do the right 
thing" with respect to accepting their share of undesirable land llses.28 
A "cram-down" mechanism, either statutorily or judicially enforced, 
leads to irrational results. 29 
In a plan state, however, cities and towns can be "forced" to satisfY 
statewide concerns in accordance with a logical planning process.30 
27 Cj. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724-
25 (NJ. 1975) [MountLaul'clI]. 
28 Undesirable land uses have been referred to as LULUs (locally unwanted land 
uses). The American Planning Association categorized these uses into three broad head-
ings: (1) "Noncontroversial" uses, such as day-care centers and courthouses; (2) "Some-
times Con troversial" uses, such as hospitals and recycling facilities; and (3) ·Con troversial" 
uses, such as airports, prisons, and sewage treatment facilities. AM. PLANNING AsS'N, 
GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING & THE MAN-
AGEMENT OF CHANGE 5-6 (Stuart Meck ed., 2002) [hereinafter APA GUIDEBOOK). 
29 See discussion infra Part III. 
30 See DIV. OF Hous., COLO. DEP'T OF LOCAL AFFAIRS, AFFORDABLE HOUSING REGULA-
TORY BARRIERS IMPACT REPORT 16 (2000) [hereinafter COLO. BARRIERS REPORT). The 
Colorado Division of Housing discussed the importance and utility of the housing element 
of a comprehensive plan: 
The first step toward removing the regulatory barriers that limit the produc-
tion of affordable housing is found in a community's long term strategic 
planning process. A local comprehensive land use plan is a product of this 
longterm vision .... The housing element of this Comprehensive Plan can 
address residential locations, policies regarding subsidies for affordable hous-
ing, and general design guidance. It is the adoption of affordable housing 
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They can be entrusted to develpp a schedule and a process-a plan-
for how, where, and when th~ construction or placement of these 
mandatory facilities or uses is to occur. Plan states respect the logic of 
ensuring both horizontal consistency among the plan's elements and 
vertical consistency between the plan itself and the regulations that 
implement the plan.31 As a result, plan states avoid the illogical result 
of requiring cities and towns to develop consistency between plans 
and regulations, only to have them voided if and when the state legis-
lature deems it appropriate. 
Finally, plan states create a process by which cities and towns de-
velop a comprehensive plan, adopt regulations to enforce and im-
plemen t the plan, and revise the plan on a regular and predictable 
basis. This process allows a court, reviewing either a facial or an as-
applied attack to a regulation, to ensure first that the regulation was 
in accordance with the comprehensive plan.32 As noted previously, in 
some states, if the regulation is not in accordance with the plan, then 
it is void ab initio.33 
The mandatory planning process ensures that cities and towns 
fulfill statewide, regional, and local concerns in a logical and predict-
able fashion. The mandatory plan is the most democratic means of 
ensuring, for example, that City A and Town B both have their fair 
share of affordable housing, appropriate amounts of open space, 
adequate commercial and industrially zoned property, and regionally 
ascertained coverage under the Telecommunications Act. 34 
Id. 
policies as an outgrowth of the Comprehensive Plan that prepares a commu-
nity to increase its affordable housing supply. 
31 See APA GUIDEBOOK, supra note 28, at 2-12 to -13. Horizontal or internal consistency 
requires that the mandated elements of the plan be consistent with each other. Sec, e.g., 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3194(3) (b) (West 2002) ("A development approved or undertaken 
by a local government shall be consistent with the comprehensive plan if the land uses, 
densities ... and other aspects of development are compatible with and further the objec-
tives, policies, land uses, and densities or in tensities in the comprehensive plan ... ."). 
32 See Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 
1156 (1955) ("The legal implications of this theory seem manifest. A city undertaking to 
exercise the land regulatory powers granted to it by state enabling legislation should be 
required initially to formulate a master plan, upon which regulatory ordinances, of which 
the zoning ordinance is but one, would then be based."). 
33 See sources cited supra note 18. 
M For example, section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 contains the re-
quirement that if local regulation of the location of telecommunication facilities is tanta-
mount to an effective prohibition, the local regulation will run afoul of the statute. Tele-
communications Act of 1996 § 704, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (B)(i) (II) (2000). The Telecom-
mun ications Act of 1996 has generated significant amounts of litigation regarding the 
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If one removes the assurance that a comprehensive planning 
program provides, then cities and towns are left to fend for them-
selves with little or no statewide guidance or support. Although mu-
nicipalities have the benefit of the presumption of validity in their ac-
tions, these actions are capable of reversal or suspension at anytime if 
the state legislature deems one issue more important than any other.35 
And while it has always been true that the state legislature can remove 
any of the powers that it granted cities and towns,36 the fact is that 
these powers need never be removed in a plan state. Simply put, in a 
plan state, cities and towns do the state's bidding, but in a predictable 
and logical fashion.37 
For example, assume that the state legislature in a plan state 
adopts the following two statutes. First, the legislature passes a law 
stating that cities and towns that fail to have at least twenty percent of 
their land area protected as open space will lose a set percentage of 
state aid dollars every year. Second, the legislature passes a law requir-
ing that cities and towns have at least twenty-five percent of their land 
area zoned for multifamily housing. In a plan state, these mandates 
can be satisfied by revisions to the local comprehensive plan and sup-
porting land use regulations. In a non-plan state, however, compli-
ance with these new laws is complicated and unguided. Which areas 
extent to which the Act preempts local government authority to prohibit or otherwise 
regulate the placement of telecommunication towers. Sec, e.g., Timothy]. Tryniecki, Cellu-
lar Tower SitingJurispmdence Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996-The First Five Yean, 37 
REAL PROP. PROB. & Th.]. 271, 272 (2002). 
[d. 
35 See infra discussion accompanying notes 48-50. 
36 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907). The HUllterCourt noted: 
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as con-
venient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State 
as may be entrusted to them .... The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may 
modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such 
property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the ter-
ritorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal 
the charter and destroy the corporation .... In all these respects the state is 
supreme. 
37 See GOVERNOR'S CTR. FOR LOCAL Gov'T SF,RVS., DEP'T OF CMTY. AND ECON. DEV., 
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., PLANNING SERIES No. 10, REDUCING LAND USE BARRIERS TO AF-
FORDABLE HOUSING 13 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA PLANNING] ("Except for 
taxing authority, the most important power that local governments possess is land use 
regulation. Unfortunately, zoning and subdivision practices can contribute in one or more 
ways to unnecessarily increase the cost of housing. The best framework for exercising local 
land use powers is a well-conceived comprehensive plan."). 
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of the city should be preserved as open space? Which areas are best 
suited for multifamily development? 
Now assume that the state mandate pertaining to open space 
noted above is revised to require that where the open space mandate 
has not been met, a State Open Space Appeals Committee will be 
authorized to hear appeals brought by any resident of the city or town 
complaining of its failure to comply with the twenty percent require-
ment. The Committee is empowered to issue an order granting the 
city or town 120 days to remedy its noncompliance by executing 
agreements with property owners to purchase, in fee or easement, 
real property for perpetual protection. If the municipality fails to 
comply with the Committee's order, the statute empowers the Com-
mittee to purchase the land on the municipality's behalf. The cost of 
the acquisition is thereafter deducted from annual state aid payments 
due the community. 
The above-noted revision would wreak havoc in a non-plan state. 
vVhat competing municipal concerns would have to be ignored while 
the Committee's order was being enforced? \\There would the com-
munity find the money to comply? What about the city or town's des-
perate need to expend funds on public services such as schools or 
housing for the elderly? 
In this hypothetical, cities and towns in a plan state would fair 
much better. They could meet as a community to discuss how to revise 
their comprehensive plan, and then determine how to alter their land 
use regulations to ensure that all new developments set aside at least 
twenty percent of the locus as protected open space. They could ad-
just their zoning codes to raise mininmm lot sizes, decrease building 
and lot coverage, increase setbacks, and tighten subdivision and wet-
land regulations. They could address the mandate in a comprehensive 
and logical fashion by addressing all the issues facing them, rather 
than in an ad hoc, "cram-down" basis. 
Almost sixty years ago, in their now famous book COlnlnunitas, 38 
Paul and Percival Goodman publicized the illogical and regressive 
results that occur in states and local governmen ts where plans are ig-
nored or non-existent. With specific reference to the housing crisis 
then existing in New York City, they criticized the fact that the City was 
facing numerous competing interests without the vision to tackle 
38 PAUL GOODMAN & PERCIVAL GOODMAN, COMMUNITAS: MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD AND 
WAYS OJ-' LIFE (Random House 1960) (1947). 
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them comprehensively.39 As discussed above, this failure and the at-
tendant consequences best describes non-plan states, such as Massa-
chusetts, today. 
II. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, AND 
WELFARE: A BASIS FOR DEVELOPING AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
Common state-imposed requirements that pertain to all local 
governments within a state include school curriculum,40 water quality 
standards,41 and traffic regulations. 42 Each requirement is perceived as 
a traditional function of the state's police powers and local regulation 
is generally not tolerated. 
A legislative mandate captures the essential relationship between 
the state and its subordinate corporations. This hierarchical relation-
ship highlights the persistent tension between municipalities and 
their respective state governments and establishes the distinction be-
tween "home rule"43 and "Dillon's Rule"44 jurisdictions. 
In a pure home rule state, a city or town is free to protect the 
"health, safety, welfare, and morals" of its citizens provided that the 
local law does not conflict with state law,45 or act where the state has 
[d. 
39 [d. at 241-42. Goodman and Goodman observe: 
Under the circumstances it seems reasonable to ask if the integration of all 
these various functions is not relevant? To give a partial list: housing, slum 
clearance, location of industries, transportation, adequate schools and teach-
ers, clean streets, traffic control, social work, racial harmony, master planning, 
recreation .... Apart from such a unified view, the apparent solution of this 
or that isolated problem inevitably leads to disruption elsewhere. Slum-
clearance as an isolated policy must aggravate class stratification .... No Mas-
ter Plan guarantees foolishness like the Lincoln Square project. These conse-
quent evils then produce new evils among them. Isolated planning Cfllt/lOt 
make sense. 
40 See Lanza v. Wagner, 183 N.E.2d 670, 675 (N.Y 1962). 
41 Section 1421 of the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 established drinking water 
quality standards. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 § 1421, 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2000). 
42 See, e.g., City of Rio Rancho v. Young, 889 P.2d 1246, 1249 (N .M. 1995). 
43 OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 108 (2d ed. 2001) ("Home 
rule has been said to be intended to allow localities to decide for themselves the form of 
local govern men t that they desire and the scope of its powers."). 
44 [d. at 159 ("Under the majority view, Dillon's Rule is an exclusive enumeration of 
powel's; no others exist."). 
45 The Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment prO\'ides a good example of the broad 
powers granted and the few powers withheld from local governments: "Any city or town 
may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise any 
power or function which the general court has power to confer upon it, which is not in-
2003] The Costs of Developing Affordable Housing 521 
preempted local governments from acting.46 Save these two excep-
tions, cities and towns are free to act in furtherance of their plans, 
policies, and locally adopted goals and programs.47 An inherent 
conflict arises, however, where the legislature in a home rule state re-
duces or rescinds previously granted powers. The courts have resolved 
this conflict, stating that the sovereign that granted the powers may 
simply take them away.48 
Absent imposition of a state mandate or preemptory language, 
however, the regulation of land uses enjoys the presumption of valid-
ity by a reviewing court.49 Thus, a city or town that adopts a zoning 
ordinance requiring 10,000 square feet per dwelling unit, or two acres 
per dwelling unit, is granted substantial deference by the judiciary if 
the ordinance is challenged.5o 
consistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court .... " MASS. CONST. 
amend. LXXXIX. § 6. 
46 The Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment provides a good example of preemp-
tion language as well: "Nothing in this article shall be deemed to grant to any city or town 
the power to: (1) regulate elections ... (2) to levy, assess and collect taxes .... ". MASS. 
CONST. amend. LXXXIX, § 7. 
47 The powers of local government to protect public health, safety, and welfare have 
been the subject of numerous federal and state court decisions. In Hadachek v. Sebastian, 
the United States Supreme Court was faced with whether the City of Los Angeles could 
enforce a prohibition against brick manufacturing on Mr. Hadacheck's land-land that he 
purchased specifically for the manufacturing of brick. 239 U.S. 394. 404-05 (1915). The 
case is riddled with due process, equal protection, regulatory takings, and estoppel issues. 
See id. at 405-07. The most memorable aspect of the Court's decision, however, is Justice 
McKenna's sweeping statement regarding the City's police powers to protect public health, 
safety, and welfare: 
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential 
powers of gOYernment, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem 
harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative neces-
sity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted arbi-
trarily. A \'ested interest cannot be asserted against it because of conditions 
once obtaining. 
!d. at 410. 
48 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) applied the rule established by the 
United States Supreme Court in Hunter v, City of Pittsburgh in the first and most prominent 
Massachusetts case that focused on the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Comprehen-
sh'e Permit Law. See Bd. of Appeals of HanO\'er v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 
409-10 (Mass. 1973); discussion supm note 36. The SJC concluded that the statute's usur-
pation of local control oYer applications under the law is within the power of the legisla-
ture and that the statute lawfully supercedes the grant of home rule powers. See Bd. of Ap-
peals of Hanover, 294 N.E.2d at 409-10. 
49 SeeBd. of Trs. ofUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2001). 
50 See id. 
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The reviewing court applies the rational basis standard. 51 If the 
court concludes that the ordinance is not "arbitrary or capricious," 
and was enacted to fulfill a legitimate governmental purpose, then the 
ordinance is valid and will stand.52 This rational basis standard en-
sures that courts will not interfere with, substitute their judgment for, 
or otherwise challenge actions taken by local legislative bodies seek-
ing to protect health, safety, or welfare.53 Although some constraints 
are in place, courts are reluctant to reverse decisions made at the 10-
cal level of government.54 
Judicial deference for legislative acts stems from the constitu-
tional requirement that the powers of the judicial, legislative, and ex-
ecutive branches of government remain separate and independent, 
precluding one branch from exercising the powers of another.55 This 
deference, in addition to their extensive regulatory powers, offers 
broad opportunities for local governments to regulate private prop-
erty in the pursuit of protecting health, safety, and welfare.56 
But this result is as it must be, given the fact that the federal gov-
ernment has never successfully regulated land at the 10callevel,57 and 
the fact that only a small minority of states have been willing to enter-
tain the idea of regulating private property at a statewide,58 or even 
51 See id. This is one of three methods of analyzing the validity of regulations adopted 
by a local government. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 18 (5th ed. 2002). 
52 State ex. rel. Grand Bazaar Liquors, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 313 N.W.2d 805, 813 
(Wis. 1982) The Wisconsin Supreme Court summarized the rational basis test as follows: 
[d. 
While we have recognized the presumption of constitutionality and the rather 
easily accommodated rational-basis test, we should not blindly rubber stamp 
legislation enacted under the guise of the city's police power when careful re-
view has revealed no logical link between the legislation and the objective it 
was enacted to effect. 
53 See Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. City of Boston, 560 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1990). 
54 [d. at 141 (¥Despite the heavy momentum in favor of affirmation of local zoning ac-
tion, the applicable principles are of judicial deference and restraint, not abdication."). 
55 V.S. CON ST. art. I-III. 
56 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
57 The Coastal Zone Management Act provides a limited exception. Coastal Zone 
Management Act, 16 V.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (2000). The Act requires that federal, state, and 
local government activities within the defined coastal zone be consistent with state coastal 
zone management plans previously approved by the federal government. 16 V.S.C. 
§ 1456(c)(l) (A)-(C) , 1456(d). 
58 Examples of state regulation of private property are limited. Exceptions include leg-
islation enacted in Florida (areas of critical environmental concern), Massachusetts (on 
Cape Cod and Martha's Vineyard via developments of regional impact), California, and 
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regional, leveI.59 Although federal or statewide regulation of land use 
C01lld lead to more comprehensive and successful management of the 
nation's natural resources, the fact is that the federal government has 
shown little interest in this approach, and the majority of states see 
land use regulation as a "local governmen tissue." 
That land use is most effectively managed at the largest scale 
practicable is a basic tenet of land use planning.60 Unfortunately, this 
principle clashes with the fact that it would be politically risky for a 
senator from Ohio to vote for land use regulations on land in Sara-
sota, Florida, or for a state representative from upstate New York to 
vote for land use controls over land on Long Island.61 
The implications of the fact that land use is managed, perhaps by 
default, at the local level of government are significant. Local officials, 
by virtue of their proximity, both physically and politically, to the af-
fected land are deemed to know best the appropriate regulations that 
should be applied to their respective landscapes.62 For example, a 
member of a city council would understand the need to rezone a por-
tion of the city to a more or less intensive use, given his or her knowl-
edge of the city's economic climate, infrastructure availability, and 
political support of the abutting neighborhood. Similarly, a member 
of a local planning board would know the importance of supporting a 
downzoning effort to protect the zone-of-contribution of the town's 
only source of drinking water. 
North Carolina (developments in the coastal zone). See APA GUIDEBOOK, supra note 28, at 
5-28. 
59 Examples of regional agencies with regulatory authority are limited. Exceptions in-
clude the Pinelands Commission (New Jersey), the Cape Cod and Martha's Vineyard 
Commissions (Massachusetts). the Adirondack Park Agency (New York). and the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency (Nevada and California). [d, at 6-20 to -21. 
60 See REYNOLDS, supra note 43, at 410-11 (explaining how zoning developed as an im-
pro\'ement O\'er lawsuits in nuisance), 
61 Richard Babcock offers some explanation for why local control has lasted despite its 
problems: 
Local control over use of private land has withstood with incredible resilience 
the centripetal political forces of the last generation. In an era of concentra-
tion of power, each blind man may offer a different explanation for the re-
markable continuing strength of local control over land use. I believe this 
condition is explained in part by the conviction of the local decision-maker 
that he is more competent to decide these questions than is his professional 
counterpart in Albany, Columbus or Sacramento. 
BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 19, 
62 Sec REYNOLDS, supra note 43, at 465. 
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These examples highlight why the majority of states grant broad 
authority to their cities and towns to regulate land use within their 
respective borders.63 When it comes to development of affordable 
housing, however, it is precisely because of such deferential treatment 
that federal,64 state, county, and even some local governments, as well 
as the private and the non-profit sectors, have called for dramatic re-
medial action.65 In some cases, the called-for actions have reversed, or 
sought to reverse, the presumption of validity afforded cities and 
towns by the rational basis test.66 
Perceived as a root cause of the lack of affordable housing, land 
use regulations, including zoning and subdivision regulations, health 
codes, building and fire codes, and fee requirements are alleged to 
represent "barriers" to affordable housing.67 Examples of these allega-
tions are numerous. A generalized example is as follows:68 Jamesville's 
minimum lot size of 20,000 square feet per dwelling unit, coupled 
with the city's subdivision regulations, rules governing wastewater dis-
posal, and impact fees, are targeted as contributing to the high costs 
of new residential construction. But for these regulatory barriers, crit-
ics argue, new home construction in Jamesville would be more vigor-
ous and resulting sales prices lower than they are with the barriers in 
place. 
The search for, and rooting out of, "barriers" to affordable hous-
ing has taken on an increased frenzy of late.69 The United States De-
63 Id. at 110 n.14 ("Forty-eight states now provide some form of home rule for munici-
palities. ") . 
64 ADVISORY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 ("Unnecessary regulations at all levels 
of government stifle the ability of the private housing industry to meet the increasing de-
mand for affordable housing throughout the country."). 
65 See, e.g., KAREN DESTOREL BROWN, EXPANDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING THROUGH IN-
CLUSIONARY ZONING 2 (2001) (citing examples of affordable housing ordinances at the 
regional level). 
66 See, e.g., CITIZENS' Hous. & PLANNING AsS'N, FACT SHEET ON CHAPTER 40B, at 
http://www.chapa.org/40b_fact.html (updated Jan. 2003) [hereinafter 40B FACT SHEET] 
(describing how Massachusetts's Chapter 40B Comprehensive Permit Law (Comprehen-
sive Permit Law or 40B) allows zoning boards of appeal to approve affordable housing 
projects even if they do not strictly meet all local zoning ordinances, in effect removing the 
presumption ofvalidity). 
67 See ADVISORY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. 
68 See, e.g., id.; PENNSYLVANIA PLANNING, supra note 37, at 1. 
69 See generally ADVISORY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8 (cataloging the impact of regu-
latory barriers on the creation of affordable housing). A letter accompanying the Advisory 
Committee's Report to President George H.W. Bush from the Secretary of the Department 
of Housing and Urban Developmen t, Jack Kemp, described the report as a "call to action" 
for federal, state, and local governments. Id. 
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partment of Housing and Urban Development has organized an ex-
tremely sophisticated Web site en titled Regulatory Baniers Clemillg-
/zollse.7o The National Association of Home Builders has published 
numerous documents on the subject.7] Several states have conducted 
"barrier" studies designed to identifY and "break down" barriers to 
affordable housing. 72 
These efforts are probably well intentioned; affordable housing is 
a key concern facing the nation's cities and towns. At issue, however, is 
how best to address the problem. One approach is to encourage and, 
if necessary, require cities and towns to develop affordable housing 
consistent with their respective comprehensive plans. This approach 
has been successfully used by several states throughout the country 
and could be readily adopted in all states.73 Another approach, and 
one that is receiving an increasingly receptive audience, seeks to 
emasculate local government efforts to manage and control local land 
use under a theory that local government regulations are "barriers" to 
affordable housing development.74 
III. BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING-A CLOSE LOOK AT THE 
MASSACHUSETTS "ANTI-SNOB ZONING ACT"75 
Legislative mandates directed toward the provision of affordable 
housing are common, but are more often expressed as desirable goals 
70 DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV .• REGULATORY BARRIERS CLEARINGHOUSE, at 
http://www.huduser.org/rbc/ (last updated Dec. 20. 2002). Note the accompanying 
commentary on the Web site, under the topic "fees and dedications," wherein the "[Sltate 
of Oregon's comprehensiye land use planning coordination" is critiqued due to the fact 
that "state law requires counties and cities to haye plans" and the State of Maine's "smart 
growth" plan is criticized due to the proposal that water and sewer extensions be chan-
neled to designated areas only. [d. 
71 See generally. e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF HOME BUILDERS, 2001-2002 LEGISLATIVE AND 
REGULATORY POLICY (2001). 
72 See generally, e.g., ARIZ. Hous. COMM'N, THE STATE OF HOUSING IN ARIZONA 2000 
(1999); COLO. BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 30; GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL COMM'N ON BARRI-
ERS TO Hous. DEV., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL 
COMMISSION ON BARRIERS TO HOUSING DEVELOPMENT (2002); PENNSYLVANIA PLANNING, 
supra note 37; OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITUR. STATE 'OF MINN., AFFURDABLE Huus-
ING (2001). 
73 See discussion infra Part IV. 
74 See discussion infra Part III. 
75 Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969 was referred to in the original House Bill (5429) as 
the "Anti-Snob Zoning Act." Act of August 23, 1969, ch. 774, 1969 Mass. Acts 712. The 
phrase and its attendant implications have stuck and remain a weapon of choice among 
the statute's supporters. See, e.g., Snob Zonillg Alert, supra note 5, at A22. 
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than as minimum standards or milestones.76 Two distinct exceptions 
to this generalized rule exist. One exception, in part the focus of this 
Symposium, is the New Jersey Supreme Court's holdings in the Mount 
Laurel cases.77 The second exception lies with the "Anti-Snob Zoning 
Act, "78 adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1969, and 
76 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 187.201 (5) (a) (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.2 to 
-22.3 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A020 (West 2002). Each of these statutes are 
designed to increase production and ensure availability of low- and moderate-income 
homes and rental units. 
77 S. Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456A2d 390 (NJ. 1983) 
[Mount Laurel 11]; Mount. Laurel I, 336A2d 713 (NJ. 1975). The Mount Laurel holdings 
espoused several important public policy positions-from the bench-and may be best 
known for the establishment of the "builder's remedy," a judicially-sanctioned override of 
local regulations to support the development of affordable housing. Perceived by some as 
a draconian intervention into the traditional home rule powers of New jersey's cities and 
towns, the Mount Laurel holdings are tame when compared with the Massachusetts statute 
and resulting case law. But see Jerold S. Kayden, Editorial, Wlto Decides Housing Issues, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Aug. 11, 2002, at D7 (concluding that the Massachusetts approach is less in-
trusive than New Jersey's). The following remarks from the New Jersey Supreme Court 
highlight the differing perceptions of the respective courts: 
The lessons of history are clear, even if rarely learned. One of those lessons is 
that unplanned growth has a price: natural resources are destroyed, open 
spaces are despoiled, agricultural land is rendered forever unproductive, and 
people settle without regard to the enormous cost of the public facilities 
needed to support them. Cities decay; established infrastructures deteriorate 
for lack of funds; and taxpayers shudder under a financial burden of public 
expenditures resulting in part from uncontrolled migration to anywhere any-
one wants to settle, roads leading to places they should never be .... More 
than money is involved, for natural and man-made physical resources are ir-
reversibly damaged. Statewide comprehensive planning is no longer simply 
desirable, it is a necessity recognized by both federal and state governments. 
Mount Laurel II, 456 A2d at 429. The SJC, bowing in deference to the legislature, have not 
taken a similar position: 
The Legislature's zoning power may be used 'where the interests of the public 
require such action and where the means employed are reasonably necessary 
for the accomplishment of the purpose.' Within these broad limits, the Gen-
eral Court is the sole judge as to how and when the power is to be exercised 
as long as it acts in accordance with the powers reserved to it by s. 8 of the 
Home Rule Amendment. 
Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. HollS. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 424 (Mass. 1973) 
(quoting Simon v. Town of Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Mass. 1942». 
78 Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, 1969 Mass. Acts 712 (codified as amended 
at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2000». Discussed in detail, the statute i.5 "anti-
suburban." A well-respected, long-time advocate of affordable housing in Massachusetts, 
who asked to remain anonymous, told the author that the statute was designed to "break 
the backs of the suburbs." To that end, the statute has and will always be, very successful. A 
more refined way of stating the objective is as follows: "Opening up the suburbs to low-
income housing is an essential element in a long-term strategy for revitalization of urban 
2003] The Costs of Dcuelaping Affordable Housing 527 
discussed in detail below. Massachusetts's Comprehensive Permit 
Statute has remained unaltered since its adoption.79 The intended 
goal of 40B remains the same as it was thirty-four years ago: to require 
that no less than ten percent of the housing stock within every city 
and town be subsidized with or by a federal or state subsidy.80 
Remembered as racist, at worst, and arrogant, at best, the na-
tion's most recent experiences with urban renewal and affordable 
housing development on a grand scale are thought of today as gov-
ernment intervention in urban affairs "gone wrong. "81 Yet, despite the 
disgraceful efforts of government central planners and the failure of 
the urban renewal programs, many vestiges of the flawed policies of 
urban renewal can be found within 40B. 
neighborhoods. Moreover, suburban isolation threatens the economic well being of the 
entire metropolitan region and thus harms suburban as well as urban residents." Note, 
State-Sponsored Growth Management As a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1127,1127-28 (1995). Clint Bolick adds: 
The problem with this anti-suburban view is that these cities-and they are 
cities-are not really the bland, faceless, non-communities described in social 
studies textbooks. People live here. People choose to live here, and they 
chose not to move out. In fact, suburban residents are less likely to move than 
their central city counterparts. 
Clint Bolick, Subverting the American Dream: Govemment Dictated "Smart G1vwth· is Unwise and 
Unconstitutional. 148 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 867 (2000) (citing Sam Staley, Urban Sprawl: A 
Grassroots Defense (Dec. 1997), at http://www.urbanfutures.org/opedstaley.html). The 
above-noted articles are decidedly opposed to governmental regulation of land use and 
they are cited here with caution. It is suspected, however, that individuals who perceive 
governmental regulation of land use as "paternalistic" would likewise rebel against the 
notion that using government as its agent, a speculator can cram-down an unlimited num-
ber of dwelling units on any parcel of land unconstrained by some rules. 
79 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23. 
I!IJ [d. The ten percen t requiremen t, however, can hardly be considered a "goal." First, 
the "goal" is not tied to a plan or statewide process to match housing needs with housing 
development. Second, the "goal" presumes that every city or town has the same housing 
needs and thus the same needs for housing production, regardless of where the municipal-
ity is located, the historic development patterns of the community, or demands placed 
upon housing due to economic expansion or contraction. Third, the "goal" exists in a 
complete vacuum. It is contradictory to articulate a goal that is not linked, in some way, to 
anyone of a variety of issues and concerns that face city and town government on a daily 
basis. 
81 ROBERT GOODMAN, AFTER TIlE PLANNERS 59 (1971) ("I submit that we have made a 
botch of urban renewal to date. By and large, people don't understand what we're after-
or even what we're talking about. This is fortunate, for if they did, we'd all have to run for 
cover." (Robinson F. Parker, Address to National 1968 Industrial Conference Board (jan. 
10,1968) (quoting David A. Wallace, former Director of the Philadelphia Redevelopment 
Authority)). 
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For example, urban renewal programs repeatedly relied upon 
state and federal money to dismantle existing neighborhoods to 
"make way" for urban redevelopment.82 As we know, these programs 
did not eradicate slums or urban decline. In fact, they accomplished 
just the opposite. They destroyed the urban core, separated and seg-
regated neighborhoods, and leveled urban history.83 
The driving forces behind urban renewal programs were federal 
and state subsidies: cash and/or cash equivalents.84 These gifts re-
warded developers with handsome discounts on land, mortgage in-
surance, grants of easements, abatements on real property taxes, and 
tax deductions.85 To avoid the appearance that developers would reap 
82 See. e.g., Knudson v, City of Decorah, 622 N.W,2d 42, 45 (Iowa 2002); Brady v. City of 
Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701, 706 (Iowa 1993); 111 re Amendment to Recreation and Open 
Space Inventory of the City of Plainfield, 802 A.2d 581, 591 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2002). 
83 Referring to the nation's highway program, the literal "vehicle" for the grand urban 
redevelopment plan, then-Pennsylvania Senator Joseph Clark stated, "It is presently being 
operated by barbarians. We ought to have some civilized understanding of just what we do 
to spots of historic interest and great beauty by the building of eight lane highways 
through the middle of our cities." TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS 200 (1997) (citing 
RICHARD O. BAUMBACH,JR. & WILLIAM E. BORAH, THE SECOND BATILE OF NEW ORI.EANS 
102 (1981)). 
84 Wilton Sogg and Warren vVertheimer completed an exhaustive analysis of the urban 
renewal programs of the day in 1959. Among other observations, the study made clear the 
direct role federal and state subsidies had on the "success" of the renewal efforts. Note, 
Urban Renewal: P1Vblems of Eliminating and Prevell(iug Urban Deterioration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 
504,528-32 (1959) [hereinafter Urban Rel/ellJa~. The authors noted: 
The cost to municipalities of conducting urban-renewal programs is consid-
erable, especially when the local public agency must acquire and clear an en-
tire area .... In order to encourage urban renewal, the federal government is 
authorized to pay up to two-thirds of the net project cost if certain require-
ments are met by the city, including the submission of an acceptable workable 
program. 
1d. at 511. 
85 See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1974). Caro critiques Robert 
Moses's efforts in the New York metropolitan area: 
[Flor though the money that built them was supposedly private money. the 
tax abatement that Moses arranged for them would, when totaled over the 
years, insure that the public investment in them would dwarf the private. and 
the powers that Moses utilized to make possible not only their construction 
but the assemblage of their site-eminent domain, street closings. utility 
easements-were all public. 
[d. at 968; see Urban Renewal, supra note 84, at 535-36. The authors discussed the relation-
ship between tax credits on the economic viability of building affordable housing: 
A project which does not produce a satisfactory cash return on the invested 
cash equity may nevertheless prove advantageous if the impact of its tax con-
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windfall profits, several programs "enforced" caps on the profits al-
lowed the private sector. These so-called "limited dividend" programs 
are strikingly similar to the limitations "imposed" by the comprehen-
sive permit program. The state and federal dollars llsed in the now-
discredited urban renewal programs were financial or related subsi-
dies that differed little from the subsidies used by 40B.86 
In one of many ironies discussed in this Article, at least the failed 
urban renewal programs required the development of an urban re-
newal plan.87 In exchange for selling or renting twenty-five percent of 
sequences on the taxpayer's business as a whole is considered. A project is de-
sirable from an investment standpoint only if the annual "cash throw-off" is 
such as to return the initial investment within a relatively short-time .... 
Since a project which would produce little or no cash throw-off before federal 
income tax may thus produce a substantial loss for tax purposes in the early 
years, and since such a loss may be deductible from other income of the tax-
payer, the tax savings produced thereby may make the project more desirable 
from an investment standpoint. 
Urban Renewal, supra note 84, at 535-36. 
86 Using federal and state dollars to lure the private sector into destroying the urban 
core was an undeniable mistake. The error lies, in large part, on ignoring the political, 
social, and environmental fabric of that portion of the city or town that was being de-
stroyed. No plan guided the government's actions. V{here there was a plan, it was rendered 
irrelevant. Professor Mandelker wrote of the failure of urban renewal projects to incorpo-
rate the general, comprehensive plan into decisions regarding slum clearance and public 
housing de\'elopment in 1967: 
Since the statute speaks of a "legislative finding: not of the general plan it-
self, a court asked to review for conformity to the provision plausibly could re-
fuse to look behind the legislative determination to ascertain whether a gen-
eral plan actually existed .... Now planning for individual projects could 
begin before the general plan was even adopted. By deferring the completion 
of the general plan until the submission of the final project plan, the federal 
agency allowed the content of the general plan to be influenced by ad hoc 
redevelopment decisions. 
Daniel R. Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Requirement in Urban Renewal, 116 U. PA. 
L. REV. 25, 41-43 (1967). 
87 Daniel Mandelker notes: "While planning has not had much influence on project 
selection, planning was intended to playa critical role in shaping project redevelopment. 
Federal legislation requires that the urban renewal project plan be related to the commu-
nity plan: Mandelker, supra note 86, at 33-34 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (a) (iii) (1964) 
(omitted and replaced by 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (1976». It was not until December, 2002, that 
the Comprehensive Permit Statute's implementing regulations made any mention of a 
"comprehensive or master plan." The regulation states: "The Committee may receive evi-
dence of and shall consider the following matters: a city or town's comprehensive plan, 
community development plan, or master plan and the city or town's effort to implement 
the housing components of such plans: MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 31.07 (2002). It re-
mains to be seen what weight the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) grants this evi-
dellCe; whatever weight is granted rests solely with HAC's discretion. IT history is any guide, 
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the dwelling units in a development project at eighty percent of the 
median income for the community, 40B permits a developer of raw, 
under-developed, or previously-developed, land to force the approval 
of a development density unconstrained by any local rule, regulation, 
ordinance, or policy.88 Put another way, in exchange for offering 
twenty-five percent of the total number of dwelling units as "afford-
able," no density restrictions are imposed, subdivision rules and regu-
lations, health regulations, historic district requirements, and any and 
all other local rules or requirements can be waived by the local board 
of appeals. As far as the developer is concerned, the sky is literally the 
limit. 
Thus, a parcel of land zoned two dwelling units to the acre can 
now contain twelve, fourteen, or forty units to the acre. A parcel pro-
hibiting structures greater than forty feet in height can contain struc-
tures 100 feet in height. Structures otherwise required to be set back 
at least twenty feet from a neighboring sideline can now be con-
structed on the neighboring sideline. In short, the only applicable 
local regulations are those "negotiated"89 between the local review 
board and the applicant.9o 
however, the HAC will not allow logical plans to interfere with the statutory mandate. See, 
e.g., Interfaith Hous. Corp. v. Bd. of Appeals, No. 72-05, slip. op. at 14 (Mass. Hous. App. 
Comm. Feb. 13, 1974) ("The legislature, however, has not written into chapter 774 this 
admittedly existing combination of serious problems as a reason for denial of a compre-
hensive permit."). 
88 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B §§ 20-23 (2000). 
89 The utility commonly associated with negotiation is outweighed by the unpredict-
able results and anarchy, when applied in the context of land use regulation. Referring to 
the connection between planning and zoning, the New York Court of Appeals cautioned 
that without a comprehensive plan acting as a rational foundation for land use decision-
making, zoning decisions "become nothing more than just a Gallup poll." Udell v. Haas, 
235 N.E.2d 897, 901 (N.Y 1968). 
90 The board of appeals is required to hear and rule upon the application on an expe-
dited basis. A public hearing must be commenced within thirty days of receipt of the com-
prehensive permit application and a decision rendered within forty days of the close of the 
public hearing. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 40B, § 21. Intrepid boards of appeal have learned 
that because virtually no comprehensive permit applicant ever presents a complete appli-
cation to the board, they can prolong rendering a final decision by extending the public 
hearing process. See, e.g., Pheasant Ridge Assocs. v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 
1160 (Mass. 1987). This strategy is fraught with risk, however, and the HAC has signaled an 
available remedy: "When the local hearing has been unduly protracted, this Committee 
will entertain an appeal on the theory that the permit has been constructively denied." 
Transformations, Inc. v. Townsend Bd. of Appeals, No. 02-14, slip op. at 4 n.3 (Mass. HOlls. 
Appeals Comm., September 23, 2002) (emphasis added) (referencing Pheasant Ridge As-
socs .• 506 N.E.2d at 1160; Milton Commons Assocs. v. Bd. of Appeals of Milton, 436 N.E.2d 
1236,1239 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)). 
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In yet another ironic aspect of Comprehensive Permit Statute, a 
board of appeals can waive rules and regulations adopted locally,91 but 
regulations promulgated by the State, even if implemented locally, 
cannot be waived. Thus, the State Building Code,92 Wetlands Protec-
tion Act,93 Environmental Policy Act,94 and wastewater disposal regula-
tions95 apply to comprehensive permit and market rate projects alike. 
The illogic of this fact is maddening. On one hand, Massachu-
setts has promulgated minimum standards for the protection of pub-
lic health and welfare--including ground, surface, and drinking water 
supplies96 and wetland resources.97 On the other hand, the Compre-
hensive Permit Statute demands a "one size fits all" approach for the 
91 For example, the regulations governing subsurface disposal of waste water are 
"minimum regulations." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31 (2000). Therefore, to protect lo-
cally specific resources from the impacts of viruses, nitrogen, or phosphorus found in 
wastewater effluent, a city or town may choose to expand the minimum setback between 
drinking water supplies and wastewater disposal systems (set by the State at 100 feet). Scc 
APA GUIDEBOOK, supra note 30, § 7-208, at 7-134 to -141. Notwithstanding the fact that this 
local regulation has a firm rational basis, the board of appeals can waive the additional 
setback imposed by the local regulation beyond the state requirement of 100 feet. Simi-
larly, whereas the state \Vetlands Protection Act grants review authority to the local conser-
vation commission for activities occurring 'within 100 feet of a wetland resource, a local 
ordinance could grant authority within a greater distance (e.g., 150 feet). MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 131 §§ 40, 40A (2000); sccTortorella v. Bd. of Health of Bourne, 655 N.E.2d 633, 
636 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). It is presumed that the board of appeals may waive the differ-
ence between the state requirement and the local, more restrictive requirement. Note, 
however, that section 20 of chapter 40B clearly--arguably intentionally--omits the phrase 
"conservation commission" from the list of local boards whose regulations can be waived. 
Exprcssio unius cst cxclllsio alterius (the specific mention of one thing is the specific exclusion 
of all things not mentioned). 
92 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 143, §§ 93-lO0 (2000); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 780, § lO1.0-.6 
(2002). 
93 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131 §§ 40, 40A; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 3lO, § 10.01-.60 (2002). 
94 MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 30, §§ 61-62H; sec MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.01-.13 
(2002); sec also Mass. Exec. Order No. 385 (1996). Executive Order 385 (EO 385) discour-
ages the use of state financing for projects that will develop previously undeveloped land 
or encourage land development in areas without adequate infrastructure. Although the 
phrase "sprawl" is not found within EO 385, it was clearly intended to minimize the use of 
state funds to encourage sprawl. Scc, c.g., Jay Wickersham, Managing Growth Without a 
Growth Managcmellt Statutc: Thc Uses of MEPA, NEW ENGLAND PLANNING, Apr. 2001, at 1. EO 
385 applies to both the admission ticket to the board of appeals and the funding obtained 
to develop the comprehensive permit project. To date, MassHousing has ignored the re-
quirements of EO 385. As discussed below, these actions are consistent with the agency's 
belief that they are immune from state regulations governing the comprehensive permit 
process. 
95 SceMASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 15.001-.505; tit. 314, §§ 4.01-.06, 5.01-.19, 6.01-.10 
(2002). 
96 Sec, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, §§ 2.01-.12, 4.01-.06, 5.01-.19, 6.01-.l0. 
97 Sec, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 10.01-.60. 
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State's 351 municipalities. Septic system regulations applicable in 
communities with geologic deposits of bedrock, for example, cannot 
be more restrictive than in communities with geologic deposits of 
sand and grave1.98 Wetland regulations in communities with extensive 
vernal pools and wildlife habitat cannot be more restrictive than in 
communities with limited and degraded wetland systems.99 Massachu-
setts's cities and towns are treated as homogenous blobs: Falmouth is 
the same as Lowell; Lenox is the same as Worcester; Rockport is the 
same as Grafton. 
Recognizing that cities and towns would rebel against this usur-
pation of local control, the Comprehensive Permit Statute created the 
Housing Appeals Committee (HAC),lOO an administrative agency to 
which an applicant whose project was denied, or approved with too 
many conditions, could appeal. 101 The HAC, through rules promul-
gated by the Department of Housing and Community Develop-
ment,102 has overseen the appeal process with an unbending com-
mitment to the intent of the statute. The Massachusetts courts have 
supported this relentless pursuit, deferring to the legislature and ar-
guably demanding that it respond. 103 
98 Contaminants behave differently in the subsurface depending upon the geologic 
environment. Contaminant pathways are predictable in a sand and gravel aquifer, for ex-
ample on Cape Cod, whereas they are grossly unpredictable in bedrock environments, for 
example on Boston's north shore or in the Berkshire communities. See, e.g., SANJAY JEER ET 
AL., NON POINT SOURCE POLLUTION: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 35 (Am. 
Planning Ass'n, Planning Advisory Service Report No. 476, 1997). 
99 ALEXANDRA D. DAWSON & SALLY A. ZIELINSKI, ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK FOR 
MASSACHUSETTS CONSERVATION COMMISSIONERS 194-95 (8th ed. 2000) Dawson and 
Zielinski note the virtues of passing local wetland regulations that are more restrictive than 
parallel state regulations. 
[d. 
There are several good reasons for increasing protection [beyond the state 
act]. The Wetlands Protection Act [the state act] is limited to protecting only 
eight wetland values .... Communities may wish to regulate work over a 
broader geographic area including wetlands not linked to water bodies and 
also including adjacent upland areas, work on which may affect wetlands and 
floodplains. 
\00 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23B, § 5A (2000). 
10\ MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 23. 
\02 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, §§ 30.00, 31.00 (2000). 
103 The SJC, however, may be signaling the Legislature that reform is due. In Z01li1lg 
Board of Appeals of Wellesley v. Ardemore A.partme1/ts Ltd. Partnership, the SJC ruled that unless 
otherwise permitted by the city or town, the affordable dwelling units within a comprehen-
sive permit project must remain affordable in perpetuity where the comprehensive permit 
violates local zoning regulations. 767 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Mass. 2002). The court said: 
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In decision after decision, the HAC has dismissed local offers of 
proof or concerns regarding the extent of affordable housing already 
existing within the city,104 environmental impacts generated by the 
new development,I05 traffic congestion and emergency access,I06 
storm-water runoff,Io7 visual impacts and property devaluation,los 
school overcrowding,lOg inconsistency with a locally adopted plan,lIO 
It may be that a comprehensive permit is essential for the construction of 
some affordable housing projects because of local zoning restrictions, and it 
may be that. in those situations, the absence of an afford ability restriction ex-
pit'ation operates as an economic disincentive to developers to build afford-
able hOUSitlg. The solution to that problem. however. lies with the Legislature. 
Id. at 596-97. Furthermore. itl Planning Board of Hingham v. Hingham Camplls. L.L.c., the 
SJC ruled that 40B does not grant a municipal plannitlg board standitlg to appeal the deci-
sion of a board of appeals. 780 N.E.2d 902. 908 (Mass. 2003). The SJC concluded that 
"' [ilf the law is to be changed, the change can only be made by the Legislature.'" Id. (quot-
itlg Commonwealth v.Jones. 632 N.E.2d 408. 410 (Mass. 1994)). 
104 Hadley W. Assocs. v. Haverhill Bd. of Appeals, No. 74-02, slip op. at 8 (Mass. Hous. 
App. Comm. Sept. 25, 1974) ("Nor does ... the fact that Haverhill ranks among 'the top 
ten cities in the Commonwealth with state and federal housing units in occupancy and 
progress' imply that Haverhill has complied with any of the mathematical criteria for 'con-
sistent with local needs.'"). 
\05 C.S.R. Mgmt.. Inc. v. Yarmouth Bd. of Appeals. No. 95-01, slip op. at 6-10 (Mass. 
Hous. App. Comm. Sept. 7, 1995). 
\06 Dexter St. L.L.C. v. N. Attleborough Bd. of Appeals, No. 00-01, slip op. at 10-12 
(Mass. Hous. App. Comm.July 12, 2000). 
\07 Spencer Livingstone Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. Medfield Zoning Bd. of Appeals. No. 
90-01, slip op. at 12-17 (Mass. Hous. App. Comm.June 12. 1991). 
\08 Cedars Holdings, Inc. v. Dartmouth Bd. of Appeals, No. 98-02, slip op. at 2-3 (Mass. 
Hous. App. Comm. May 24. 1999). 
109 Interfaith Hous. Corp. v. Bd. of Appeals of Gardner, No. 72-05, slip op. at 14 (Mass. 
HollS. App. Comm. Feb. 13. 1974). Prior to the decision, Gardner High School had lost its 
accreditation due to overcrowding, and the board based its denial of the comprehensive 
permit, in part, on the overcrowding of its public schools. The HAC reversed, however: 
/d. 
The unfortunate combitlation of overcrowded schools. high construction 
costs to provide more schools, and taxes already at the breakitlg poitH, is a sad 
fact of life that presently besets almost every municipality in the country .... 
Apparently, the legislature felt that existing needs for low and moderate in-
come housing were so overriditlg as to have priority over the admittedly press-
ing problem of overcrowded schools. 
1\0 Plannitlg Office for Urban Affairs v. N. Andover Bd. of Appeals. No. 74-03, slip op. 
at 13-15 (Mass. Hous. App. Comm. May 5, 1975). The regulation setting the criteria for 
decisions of the HAC was revised. effective December 20. 2002, to itlclude the following: 
"The Committee may receive evidence of and shall consider the following matters: 1. a city 
or town's master plan. comprehensh'e plan, or community development plan, and 2. the 
results of the city or town's efforts to implement such plans." l\iASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, 
§ 31.07(3)(d) (2002). Two years prior to that revision, the Chairman of the HAC wrote, 
"'''bat these cases make clear is that if towns take control of their own planning processes 
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impact on the municipality's tax base,lll and water supply and water 
pressure limitations.1l2 
Judicial support for the decisions of the HAC, and 40B in gen-
eral, is perplexing given the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 
(SJC) decision in Vazza v. Board of Appeals of B1'Ockton.l13 In Vazza, the 
SJC noted: 
Purchasers of real estate are entitled to rely on the applica-
ble zoning ordinances or by-laws in determining the uses 
which may be made of the parcel they are buying .... For 
many persons, particularly those purchasing houses, this is 
the largest single investment in their lives. It is important 
that such purchasers be able to determine with reasonable 
accuracy, before making that investment, just what the appli-
and put affordable housing on their agendas, their local autonomy will be respected under 
the Comprehensive Permit Law." Werner Lohe, The Massackusetts Comprehensive Pennit LalU: 
Collaboration Between Affordable Housing Advocates and Environmentalists, LAND USE L. & ZON-
ING DIG., May 2000, at 3. The combination of the regulatory revision and the Chairman's 
comments should give hope to cities and towns seeking to develop affordable housing in a 
state with no planning or consistency requirements. The facts, however, prove differently. 
Since the Chairman's article, the HAC has: (1) overturned a denial by a board of appeals 
and approved a comprehensive permit in a community where the median sale price of a 
dwelling unit was less than the sale price of the deed restricted units permitted by the 
Committee's order; (2) reversed a decision by a board of appeals denying a comprehensive 
permit to build on a parcel of land noted "Not A Buildable" lot, holding that such a nota-
tion could be waived in the pursuit of affordable housing; (3) concluded that the legisla-
Hire'S definition of satisfying the statutory obligation for the total land area that is devoted 
to affordable housing is measured by the land area in which the building occurs and not 
the total area of the parcel subject to the development. See generally Delphic Assocs. v. Mid-
dleborough Bd. of Appeals, No. 02-11 (Mass. HollS. App. Comm. Dec. 23, 2002); Clover-
leaf Apartments, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Natick, No. 01-21, slip op. 
at 2-3 (Mass. HollS. App. Comm. Mar. 4, 2002); Woodridge Realty Trust v. Ipswich Bd. of 
Appeals, No. 00-04 (Mass. Hous. App. Comm.June 28, 2001). 
III Woodcrest Vill. Assocs. v. Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Maynard. No. 72-13, slip op. 
at 27 (Mass. Hous. App. Comm. Feb. 13, 1974). 
112 Coop. Alliance of Mass. v. Taunton Bd. of Appeals, No. 90-05, slip op. at 14-15 
(Mass. HollS. App. Comm. Apr. 2, 1992). In Cooperative Alliance, HAC reinforced the rela-
tive lack of importance of local needs: 
[d. 
But this cannot mean that any condition which insures adequate water supply 
is automatically consistent with local needs. IT this were the case, any town 
wishing to block affordable housing could simply identify a legitimate local 
concern and then require that it be remedied in the most expensive way pos-
sible. Thus we believe that also implicit within the definition of consistency 
with local needs is that any condition be reasonable. 
113 269 N.E.2d 270 (Mass. 1971). 
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cable zoning ordinances or by-laws are, and what uses they 
permit or prohibit.114 
535 
Moreover, the court's concern for the due process rights-the 
ability to predict with some certainty the allowable uses on a parcel of 
land-is noticeably absent in its support for 40B. The statute provides 
no "reasonable accuracy," as was deemed so importan t in Vazza for 
property owners, neighborhoods, cities, or towns to determine what 
will happen on the parcel of land next door, down the street, or 
within the corporate boundaries. The comprehensive permit process 
is predictable only in its unpredictability. Any and all parcels of land 
are subject to it, at any time and at any density. 
Perhaps injured by the publicity and attendant public outrage 
accompanying such decisions, the Department of Housing and 
Community Development has embarked on an aggressive campaign 
to "soften" the applicable regulations,Il5 and thereby attempt to check 
the groundswell seeking to repeal the statute.116 Due to the timidity of 
the Department's actions to date, it has been ineffective in reigning in 
the HAC.ll7 
114 Id. at 274. 
115 Among the most noteworthy revisions are: (1) a limitation on the number of dwell-
ing units that can be developed per application depending upon the size of the commu-
nity; (2) a twelve-month "cooling off" period between the filing of a market rate develop-
mellt plan and the filing of a comprehensive permit; and (3) an ability of a city or town to 
prepare a housing plan and thus deny or condition comprehensive permits if the city or 
town creates qualified housing units that amount to at least three-quarters of one percent 
of the community's total housing stock per year. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 31.07(1) (g)-
(i) (2002). Note that in each case, however, the ability to deny or condition a comprehen-
sive permit remains an option for the board of appeals even where the city or town would 
otherwise be "consistent with local needs." Id. § 31.07(1) (g). Thus, no appeal by the appli-
cant is allowed to the Housing Appeals Committee. The upshot of this permissive language 
is that the "lawlessness" and unpredictability of the statute remains in full force and effect 
even where the city or town has met the obligations set forth in the statute. 
116 Before this Article went to press, over sixty bills are pending in the Massachusetts 
General Court pertaining to reform of the comprehensive permit statute. Sec, e.g., H.B. 
Nos. 813, 1566. 3391 183rd Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2003); S.B. Nos. 500. 561, 1799, 183rd. Gen. Ct. 
(Mass. 2003). 
117 The HAC recently concluded that a board of appeals could not impose a require-
mellt that the sale of affordable dwellings be subject to resale restrictions that survive 
bankruptcy or foreclosure by the lender as a condition of approval. Delphic Assocs., L.L.C. 
\'. Hudson Bd. of Appeals, No. 02-11, slip op. at 8 (Mass. Hous. App. Comm. Dec. 23, 
2002). This conclusion was based on the Committee's belief that 
there is no evidence that foreclosure is a common occurrence. Second ... the 
town has a right of first refusal that permits it to step in and purchase the unit 
if no affordable purchaser can be located .... And, even if the unit is lost, the 
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A. The Housing Appeals Committee Process 
Before applying to the city or town, an applicant for a compre-
hensive permit1l8 is required to obtain a project eligibility letter1l9 in 
town is compensated, since it receives the windfall generated by the sale, 
which can [then bel put that to use for other affordable housing purposes. 
Id. The consequences of this decision are staggering. Imagine a scenario in which a 
qualified income buyer purchases a dwelling in a comprehensive permit project that is ten 
tinles more dense than the underlying zoning permits. The "social benefit" of ignoring 
local zoning is complete. Twenty-five percent of the dwelling units are sold to needy pur-
chasers. Later, some of the dwelling units are repossessed by the lending institution, 
through bankruptcy proceedings and for a variety of possible reasons. According to the 
HAC, these dwelling units can now be sold free of any affordability restriction. The "social 
benefit" that trumped local zoning and the historic deference to local police powers has 
disappeared. Having lost some of the affordable dwellings that count toward its ten per-
cent quota, the community must go through the process oyer and oyer again. Is it "snob 
zoning" to demand that a tradeoff of trumping all local zoning regulations should be the 
protection of affordable dwelling units in perpetuity? The HAC justified its decision on the 
statement that "there is no eyidence that foreclosure is a common occurrence." Id. Well 
before the decision was issued, however, the Boston Business Journal reported that while the 
Massachusetts foreclosure rate was far below the rates of the early 1990s, government loan 
defaults were increasing in Massachusetts and nationwide. Donna L. Goodison, Residential 
Foreclosures Creep Up in the Bay State, BOSTIlN Bus. j., June 17, 2002, available at 
http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston!stories/2002/06/17 !story7.html (last visited Mar. 
4,2003). The Boston Globe reports that foreclosures are likely to rise. Thomas Grillo, Mass. 
Horne Foreclosures Fall in '02 Low Interest Rates Cited; Bankruptcies Down 1.5 Percent, BOSTIlN 
GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2003, at E1 ("Many homeowners are eating up the equity in their house 
and it won't be long before the value is gone and they find themselves in deep financial 
trouble."). As if the HAC's justification for allowing a foreclosure to wipe out the afforda-
bility restriction is not bad enough, the HAC suggests that if there is a foreclosure, the host 
city or town will be the beneficiary of a windfall. Delphic Assocs., No. 02-11, slip op. at 8. 
Surely, local officials must be puzzled by the hypocrisy of the HAC's decision. Isn't the 
point of the statute to develop affordable housing? Does the HAC really believe that the 
"windfall" will go to affordable housing creation when in fact, the money will be needed to 
compensate the city or town for the added cost burdens imposed by the destruction of 
local zoning and whatever plans and programs the city or town has in place? 
118 An applicant can be a public agency, a nonprofit agency, or a "limited dividend or-
ganization." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20 (2000). A limited dividend organization is 
anyone who agrees to limit its profit to that set by the subsidizing agency. One of the most 
popular subsidizing agents is MassHousing. MassHousing has established a profit cap for 
fee projects at twenty percent, meaning that the total return on a fee deyelopment project 
cannot exceed twenty percent. MASS. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, HOUSING STARTS PROGRAM 
OVERVIEW, at hup:/ /www.masshousing.com/sf!sCcstrln.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). 
Excess profits must be returned to the municipality for affordable housing purposes. This 
otherwise magnanimous gesture is actually a cruel hoax on the community at large. See 
sources cited infra note 144. 
119 The validity of the letter has been the subject of much debate since a ruling by the 
HAC in 1999 that private banks that are members of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Bos-
ton can issue project eligibility letters. Stu born Ltd. P'ship v. Barnstable Bd. of Appeals, 
No. 98-01, slip op. at 2 (Mass. Hous. App. Comm. March 5,1999). 
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order to gain admission to the municipal board of appeals. 120 The 
presumed purpose of this letter is to ensure that only bona fide appli-
cants will be able to engage the board of appeals, and the board "will 
not spend time reviewing a proposal that is unlikely to be realized. "121 
This gatekeeper strategy is theoretically a good one. Rogue appli-
cants seeking nothing more than to develop on a parcel of marginal 
land-land that heretofore had been deemed undevelopable-would 
be rejected and would not receive the eligibility ticket needed to ap-
ply for a comprehensive permit. Thus, the gatekeeper could be con-
120 The regulation states, "To be eligible to submit an application for a comprehensive 
permit ... the applicant and the project .... shall be fundable by a subsidizing agency 
under a low and moderate income housing subsidy program." MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, 
§ 31.01 (l) (b) (2002). Fundability, in turn, "shall be established by submission of a written 
determination of Project Eligibility by a subsidizing agency .... " [d. § 31.01 (2). 
121 Hous. APPEALS COMM., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., GUIDELINES FOR LOCAL REVIEW 
OF COMPREHENSIVE PERMITS (1999), at http://www.state.ma.us/dhcd/components/hac/ 
guide.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003); see also Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Hous. Appeals 
Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 420 (Mass. 1973) In Board of Appeals of Hal/over, the SJC discussed 
the importance of full disclosure and transparency in the 40B application process: 
The board's and the committee's power to require full disclosure of the ap-
plicant's present or planned property interest, and their power to grant con-
ditional permits that do not become operative until the applicant has satisfied 
the funding agency's property interest requirements, provide ample protec-
tion against the unlikely possibility of frivolous applicants who have no pres-
ent or potential property interest in the site. 
[d. One wonders what the court meant by the use of the word "potential." See id. Any and 
all applicants have the potential of acquiring the necessary property interest in the site. See 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 31.01 (3) (specifying the extent of property interests). 
Either a preliminary determination in writing by the subsidizing agency that 
the applicant has sufficient interest in the site, or a showing that the applicant 
or any entity 50% or more of which is owned by the applicant, owns a 50% or 
greater interest, legal or equitable, in the proposed site, or holds any option 
or contract to purchase the proposed site, shall be considered by the Board 
or the Committee to be conclusive evidence of the applicant's interest in the 
site. 
[d. The court in Board of A.ppeals of Hanover neglected to foresee how entrepreneurial ap-
plicants would satisfy this requirement. See 294 N.E.2d at 420-21 (discussing eligibility 
without mention of entrepreneurs). The requirement is presumably satisfied if a purchase 
and sales agreement is executed with terms highly favorable to the offeror. For example, a 
speculator executes a purchase and sales agreement with the owner of developed, under-
developed, or marginal land contingent upon the receipt of a comprehensive permit for a 
density eight or ten times what the underlying zoning allows. No deposit is made, no expi-
ration date is included, and no penalties are imposed for breach by the offeror. This will 
satisfy the regulatory requirements. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 31.01 (3). In the alter-
native, a landowner executes a purchase and sales agreement or a deed to herself as tn1s-
tee of a tfllS!. The beneficiary of the trust is herself. This purchase and sales agreement 
and/or deed will also satisfy the regulatory requirements. See id. 
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sidered some sort of trustee with the host community as beneficiary, 
and the land subject to the comprehensive permit as corpus. 
In fact, the SJC and the HAC have elevated the role of the gate-
keeper to nothing short of trustee status. Because of the trust im-
puted to the subsidizing agency in its review of applications for proj-
ect eligibility status, the SJC and the HAC have established the 
principle that a local government has extremely limited authority to 
review or comment upon the matters contained within the project 
eligibility approval.122 This point is worth restating. The SJC and the 
HAC presume that the subsidizing agency is professional, thorough, 
and diligent in its investigation of applications for project eligibility 
status. This implies that the agency has, among other things, investi-
gated the parcel subject to the application, investigated the 
qualifications of the applicant, and ensures that the proposal is consis-
ten t with neighborhood characteristics.123 
The importance of a thorough project-eligibility review, and per-
haps a basis for the SJC's and the HAC's blind reliance on the word of 
the subsidizing agency, is that once issued, the ticket becomes not just 
a ticket to the local board of appeals, but also to the HAC. And a 
ticket to the HAC almost always ensures a successful outcome for the 
applicant-developer.124 
In practice, however, the gatekeeper is an illusion and the trustee 
is in breach. The process is a charade; one designed to lure the public 
into a belief that government agencies are watching out for the public 
interest. Whether the courts and the HAC understand the illusory 
effect of the project eligibility process as it is being abused is unclear. 
In fact, the gatekeeper responsible for issuing the majority of project 
eligibility letters, MassHousing, rejects any notion that it is obligated 
to comport with any rule or regulation promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Housing and Community Development.125 Free, at least in its 
122 See Rd. of Appeals of Hanover, 294 N.E.2d at 420-21; Welch v. Easton Bd. of Appeals. 
No. 94-06. slip op. at 2-3 (Mass. HOllS. App. Comm. Feb. 28, 1995) (citing MASS. REGS. 
CODE tit. 760, § 31.01 (2)) ("Prior to applying for a comprehensive permit, a proposal must 
be submitted to a subsidizing agency for preliminary approval, it is then 'presumed fund-
able if a subsidizing agency makes a written determination of project eligibility ... .'"). 
123 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 31.01 (2) (b). 
124 See Sharon Perlman Krefetz, Tlte I11lpact and Evolution of tlte NlassacllUsetts C011lprehen-
sive Pemlit and Zoning Appeals Act: Tltirty Years of ExpCliellce witlt a State Legislative Effort to 
OverC011le Exclltsiollwy Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 381, 397-98 (2001) ("The pattern of 
decisions by the HAC is striking: local zoning board decisions have been upheld in only 18 
cases and overruled in 94 cases."). 
125 See Town of Duxbury v. Mass. HOllS. Fin. Agency, No. PLCV2002-00298 (Mass. Su-
per. Ct. filed March 12, 2002). The Town of Duxbury alleged that MassHousing failed to 
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opinion, from any state oversight and responsibilities, the state's larg-
est producer of project eligibility letters believes it can issue admission 
tickets to any applicant, for any parcel of land, at arguably any density. 
vVithout the assurance that the applicant is a bona fide developer and 
that the land sought for development is appropriate for the density 
proposed, the comprehensive permit process, already chaotic and 
unpredictable, becomes intolerable.126 As currently applied, cities and 
towns cannot rely on the subsidy agents to weed out inappropriate 
applications and, at the same time, are estopped from doing so them-
selves.127 
If the applicant's 40B application is denied, he or she may take 
an appeal to the HAC, where victory is almost certain.128 If approved 
comply with the "gatekeeper" requirements of title 760, section 31.01 of the Code of Mas-
sachusetts Regulations. Id. MassHousing's Answer denied that the relevant regulations are 
"binding upon MassHousing." Sec Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Town 
of Duxbury v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency (Mass. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 12, 2002) (No. 
PLCV2002-00298) (withdrawn). MassHousing advanced a similar argument: "It should be 
noted at the outset, that [MassHousing] is not, in any technical sense, bound to obey the 
rules promulgated by the HAC pursuant to Chapter 40B." Id. 
126 The irony is the fact that the project eligibility letter provides the applicant with an 
almost impenetrable presumption of \'alidity, yet we know that the subsidizing agencies 
believe they have no responsibilities to comply with the regulations promulgated by the 
State, even if they performed the due diligence the courts and the public presume they 
have done. Sec Town of Duxbury, y. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. PLCV2002-00298 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. filed Mar. 12,2002). 
127 This fact raises the question as to the true underlying purpose of the statute. If, for 
example, the purpose of the statute was to create affordable housing units, units of hous-
ing that were affordable would count toward the required quota. Mobile homes, generally 
more affordable than "stick-built" homes, would thus count toward the municipal re-
quirement. Mobile rental certificates, often referred to as "Section 8" vouchers, would also 
qualify. But the State's leading advocate for affordable housing, the Citizens Housing and 
Planning Association (CHAPA), has continually opposed the counting of mobile homes 
and Section 8 vouchers toward the requirement: "If the Legislature agrees to count mobile 
homes and Section 8 vouchers, 67 communities will immediately go over the 10% afford-
able housing goal without building one new unit of housing." CITIZENS' H(ws. & PLAN-
NING A5S'N, The Impact oj Counting Mobile Homes and VOUChC1:5 Under Chapter 40B, in OBTAIN-
ING COMPREHENSIVE PERMITS 141 (MCLE, Inc., No. 2002-88006-25, 2002). Given CHAPA's 
position, it seems dear that the goal of 40B might have very little to do with creating af-
fordable housing, but rather simply the construction work related to the creation of hous-
ing. Sec id. 
128 Recently, however, the HAC has upheld two comprehensive permit denials on Cape 
Cod. Stu born Ltd. P'ship \'. Barnstable Bd. of Appeals, No. 98-01, slip op. at 7-8 (Mass. 
Hous. App. Comm. Sept. 18, 2002) (finding that Barnstable's comprehensive plan in-
cluded an aggressive campaign to build affordable housing in each of the town's villages); 
Dennis HollS. Corp. v. Dennis Bd. of Appeals, No. 01-02, slip op. at 5-6 (Mass. Hous. App. 
Comm. May 7, 2002) (finding that a fifty-unit building within a historic district would in-
terfere too much with wetlands and stormwater runoff, and would leave no useable open 
space). It is important to note, though, that the HAC cannot overrule state legislation. Sec, 
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with too many conditions, then the applicant may likewise appeal, and 
victory is again almost certain.129 
Through an elaborate system of regulations and strengthened by 
over thirty years of administrative decisions, the Comprehensive Per-
mit Statute has, according to several commentators, produced ap-
proximately 25,000 units of affordable housing.130 But as noted previ-
ously, this Article does not attack the ends, but rather the means of 
40B. That 1000, 25,000, or 100,000 housing units have been created 
under the statute is not relevant to this debate. Instead, the debate 
should focus on whether the means sought to accomplish the pur-
ported objective are constitutionally supportable and, if not, what al-
ternate objectives exist. Mter all, if the means sought to accomplish 
the end result are unconstitutional or violate public policy,131 then the 
ultimate results are irrelevant. 132 
e.g., Bd. of Appeals of N. Andover v. HollS. Appeals Comm., 357 N.E.2d 936, 940 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1976). Because nine of the Cape's fifteen towns have adopted comprehensive 
plans in accordance with the Cape Cod Commission Act (state legislation), these decisions 
could be read as precluding HAC interference with properly-promulgated comprehensive 
plans. At issue is how much noblesse oblige should be afforded the HAC by these deci-
sions. One view is that the HAC was aware of the overwhelming evidence that the Cape 
Cod towns (through the Cape Cod Commission Act) have been developing affordable 
housing at a faster pace and more equitably through the inclusionary requirements of the 
Cape Cod Commission Act. A reversal by the HAC may have illustrated that the Compre-
hensive Permit Statute cares little about municipal efforts to build affordable housing and 
far more about getting housing built, anywhere, without regard to promulgated rules or 
regulations. 
129 See Krefetz, supm note 124, at 398 ("It is quite significant that in cases appealed to 
the HAC, the Committee rarely has found that the local decision was 'reasonable and con-
sis ten t with local needs.'"). 
130 The range of estimates is extreme, but averages approximately 25,000. See id. at 392 
(stating that as of 1999, over 21,000 dwelling units, 18,000 of which are affordable, have 
been built using the Comprehensive Permit Statute); Thomas Frillo, The Other Lottery Priced 
Ollt? With the il.llti-Snob-Zoning Law alld a Little Luck, IOIl'1l Be ill the Market, Bos']DN GLOBE, 
Dec. 8, 2002, at]1 (reporting that as of December, 2002, 30,000 affordable dwelling units 
have been built); 40B FACT SHEET, supra note 66 (reporting that since 1970 more than 400 
developments have been built in more than 200 communities, representing approximately 
30,000 units of affordable housing). 
131 A careful review of three decades of decisions by the HAC and the administrative 
code governing the Committee evidences what DeTocquevilie labeled "administrative des-
potism": 
Over this kind of men stands an immense, protective power which is alone 
responsible for securing their enjoyment and watching over their fate. That 
power is absolute, thoughtful of detail, orderly, provident and gentle. It would 
resemble parental authority if, father like, it tried to prepare its charges for a 
man's life, but on the contrary, it only tries to keep them in perpetual child-
hood .... Why should it not entirely relieve them from the trouble of think-
ing and all the cares of living? 
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B. The Massachusetts ComjJ1'ehensive Permit Law Violates Procedural and 
Substantive Due Process 
Local legislative actions intended to protect public health, safety, 
and welfare generally receive the deferential presumption of validity 
from a reviewing conrt. 133 The presumption of validity is based, in 
part, on the belief that the legislative action is intended to protect 
public health, safety, and welfare. And although state legislative 
authority is far broader than that of local governments,134 statutes 
promulgated by state legislatures must nevertheless comport with 
fundamental principles of due process and related constitutional 
guaran tees. 135 
Having thus taken each citizen in turn in its powerful grasp and shaped 
him to its will. government then extends its embrace to include the whole of 
society. It cO\'ers the whole of social life with a network of petty, complicated 
rules that are both minute and uniform, through which even men of the 
greatest originality and the most vigorous temperament cannot force their 
heads above the crowd. It does not break men's will, but softens, bends, and 
guides it; it seldom enjoins, but often inhibits, action; it does not destroy any-
thing, but prevents much being born; it is not tyrannical, but it hinders, re-
strains, enervates, stifles, and stultifies so much that in the end each nation is 
no more than a flock of timid and hardworking animals with the government 
as its shepherd, 
A great many people nowadays very easily fall in with this brand of com-
promise between administrative despotism and the sovereignty of the people. 
ALEXIS DETocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 692-93 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. 
Mayer ed., Harperperennial 1988). 
132 Mario Cuomo eloquently illustrated this point: 
·Survival of the fittest" may be a good working description of the process of 
evolution, but a government of humans should elevate itself to a higher or-
de1~ one which tries to fill the cruel gaps left by chance or by wisdom we don't 
understand. I would rather have laws written by Rabbi Hillel or Pope John 
Paul II than by Darwin. 
Mario Cuomo, First I1Iaugurai A.ddress, ill MORE THAN WORDS 7,10 (1993). 
133 See discussion supra Part II. 
134 See 'MAN DELKER ET AL., supra note 51, at 26 (articulating the principle that although 
the United States Constitution places express limits on the powers of the federal govern-
ment, state constitutions place no such limitations on the exercise of state power, which is 
bound only by the limits of due process). 
135 See State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc. 448 A.2d 791, 794-95 (Vt. 1982) (noting 
that, unless a state law or regulation uses a suspect c1assification-one based upon race, 
sex, religion, or national origin-the judiciary will treat the governmental action with 
great deference). 
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Consider the following example: Jamesville, a medium-sized town 
in Massachusetts adopts a capital budget136 and a comprehensive plan. 
Less than ten percent of the town's housing stock qualifies as subsi-
dized under 40B. The town, unfortunately, has little hope of with-
standing an appeal of a local denial of a comprehensive permit. The 
fact that the capital budget indicates that the town has no financial 
ability to build a new school, wastewater treatment plant, or library 
within the next five years has, at best, limited evidentiary value before 
the HAC.137 
Assuming that the HAC, in derogation of the local comprehen-
sive plan and capital budget, grants the comprehensive permit, where 
do we find the public benefit? Is there a public benefit in eradicating 
the local planning process? Is there a public benefit in ignoring the 
will and votes of the local legislature? Is there a public benefit in cre-
ating and enforcing a statute that transforms all land parcels, large 
and small, vacant and developed, upland and wetland, flat or rocky, 
into developments of unlimited potential densities? Where is the pub-
lic benefit in the chaos this statute creates? 
Whatever benefits are passed on to the purchasers or renters of 
the dwelling units contained within a 40B development, they are 
dwarfed by the damage caused to due process and the public's sense 
of security in the land use system. Land developmen t in the absence 
of predictable rules is anarchy.138 Although rules and regulations are 
constantly changing, their change is the result of a deliberative proc-
ess-due process. 
136 A capital budget. often referred to as a capital improvement budget, provides a list-
ing and method of payment for a city's or town's capital needs including: buildings 
(schools, police, and fire stations), infrastructure (water and wastewater treatment sys-
tems), and equipment (fire trucks, ambulances, and police cruisers). ROBERT BERNE & 
RICHARD SCHRAMM, ThE FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTS 58 (1986). Capital budg-
ets (and capital plans, a long-range projection of capital needs) are the foundation of inI-
pact fee programs. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674.21 (V) (a) (1996) (requiring that 
inIpact fees "be a proportional share of ... capital improvement costs ... reasonably re-
lated to the capital needs created by the development"). 
137 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 3l.05(1) (2002) ("Consistency with local needs is 
the central issue in all cases before the Committee.") Recall that the ·consistency with local 
needs" standard is satisfied when a city or town builds the requisite number of dwelling 
units consistent with the ten percent quota requirements. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, 
§ 20 (2000). 
138 See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 84 (6th ed. 1990) (defining anarchy as the "absence 
of government ... destructive of and confusion in government .... At its best it pertains 
to a society made orderly by good manners rather than law, in which each person produces 
according to his powers and receives according to his needs .... "). 
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The Massachusetts statute, 40B, fails to comport with procedural 
and substantive due process. The statute, by its very definition, creates 
an unpredictable, and thus unfair, outcome. By suspending local rules 
and regulations, or at least allowing for the possibility that local rules 
and regulations will be suspended, the statute violates fundamental 
principles of fairness. 
C. The Comp1"ehensive Permit Statute Represents an 
Unconstitutional "Giving"139 
A legislative action can also lose its presumption of validity where 
the action creates a constitutional violation, including "taking" private 
property without compensation. Regulatory takings-where govern-
ment goes "too far" in regulating private property-have been the 
subject of numerous decisions. l40 For now, however, I suggest that 40B 
not be viewed as constituting a regulatory taking, but rather a regula-
tory "giving." 
A theoretical regulatory taking argument could emerge from an 
inclusionary zoning program. HI The Comprehensive Permit Statute is 
the polar opposite of an inclusionary zoning program, however. 
Rather than take affordable housing units from the developer, it gives 
unlimited density bonuses to the developer. 
A regulatory taking is an action by government that so deprives a 
landowner of economic value that the government's action is as if the 
land had been taken by eminent domain. A regulatory "giving" is the 
opposite of a regulatory taking. A giving is an action by government 
that grants unearned or uncompensated benefits to the private sector. 
The Comprehensive Permit Statute is a regulatory giving in that the 
applicant is given-gifted-an unlimited development density and 
139 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, III YALE LJ. 547, 577-89 
(2001) (arguing the flipside to the traditional concept that individuals should be compen-
sated for "takings· and asserting that governments should also be compensated for "giv-
ings· in certain cases). The use of the phrase "givings· in this Article is adopted from this 
work. See id. 
140 See generally, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302 (2002); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Agins v. City 
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978); William Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979). 
141 See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. et aI., Inciusiollary Housing Ordinance Survives Constitutional 
Challenge in Post·Nollan-Dolan Em, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Aug. 2002, at 3 (arguing 
that inclusionary housing ordinances could withstand a facial constitutional challenge). 
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unlimited profit potentia}l42 in exchange for a perceived public 
benefit. As takings jurisprudence weighs a variety of factors to evalu-
ate whether government's actions have "gone too far," so too can an 
evaluation of governmental givings. 143 
At issue is the giving, or the gift, of 40B. Recall that under 40B, 
the applicant need not obey local zoning regulations, including but 
not limited to: use, density, area, lot coverage, and frontage. 144 An un-
limited density bonus is gifted in exchange for the set-aside of one 
below-market dwelling unit for every four market-rate units proposed. 
Thus, a development of 100 dwelling units must contain at least 
twenty-five sold or rented at a rate no greater than eighty percent of 
median income. That twenty-five percent of the dwelling units must 
be sold or rented at a price below market rates does not transform the 
legislation into a permissible quid pro quo. The end result remains a 
gift. The donee-developer is the beneficiary of the gift. The donor-
municipality and abutting property owners pay the cost. 
The costs of the gift can be measured in several ways. First, the 
cost of new development not otherwise planned for, foreseeable, or 
quantifiable is imposed upon the community, regardless of infrastruc-
ture limitations. These costs include those related to education, pub-
142 Neither the statute nor the regulations governing the HAC define the profit al-
lowed a comprehensive permit developer. This raises three significant problems. First, the 
National Association of Home Builders determined that the average profit margin earned 
by home builders in the country, before taxes, is approximately 6.35%. NAT'L AsS'N OF 
HOME BUILDERS, THE BUSINESS OF BUILDING 8 (2001). Yet the subsidy programs used in 
the comprehensive permit program for fee based projects allow a twenty percent profit. 
See, e.g., HOME OWNERSHIP DIV., MAssHOUSING, HOUSING STARTS, available at http://www. 
masshousing.com/ sf/housingstarts/housingstarts.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003). Second, 
the cost accounting to determine the actual profit earned by an applicant is suspect. To 
avoid reaching the twenty percent profit cap, an applicant merely needs to "increase" his 
costs associated with the project. Increases in "overhead" or "project management" are 
categories that provide for almost unlimited deception. Third, and perhaps most disturb-
ingly, because the statute requires that the local board not deny or saddle an approval with 
so many conditions as to render the project "uneconomic," a clever applicant merely sub-
mits a pro forma estimate weighted with development costs. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, 
§ 20 (2000). This will result in a pro forma profit well below the twenty percent cap. The 
most notorious of these schemes includes the applicant selling the land that he bought for 
$150,000 to himself for $2,000,000, for example. This "transaction" purports to show a 
land acquisition cost high enough to cram an endless number of dwelling units on the 
land without the project ever reaching the twenty percent cap. And because the calcula-
tion of the allowed profit is made during the local deliberative process, this charade allows 
the developer dwelling units far in excess of what is required to keep the project from be-
coming "uneconomic." 
143 See Penn. Cent., 438 U.S. at 136-37. 
144 See discussion supra Part III. 
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lic safety, water and wastewater services, and so on. As previously dis-
cussed, the HAC has never accepted the cost burdens imposed by a 
40B project as justification for permit denial,l45 Conversely, limitations 
on infrastructure are seen as the "community's problem" and must be 
addressed, regardless of the imposition of new developmen t.146 
Second, cities and towns develop long-range wastewater and wa-
ter supply, open space, and building needs plans because it makes 
good sense to do so. These plans are virtually thrown out the win-
dow-along with local zoning and subdivision regulations, among 
others--in the face of a comprehensive permit. For example, the city 
or town's decision to defer extending wastewater service to a portion 
of the city or town until three years from today is reversed to accom-
modate the comprehensive permit. 
Third, the cost of losing the public's trust, although not 
quantifiable, is certainly unpalatable. As long as the Comprehensive 
Permit Statute remains as is, no parcel of land, whether fully built 
upon, partially built upon, undeveloped, or historically considered 
"undevelopable," is safe from a 40B application. This fact leaves the 
public-landowners, tenants, and public officials-in a constant state 
of uncertainty. The public trust is eroded when government officials, 
in this case the board of appeals, are forced to elevate one develop-
ment project in lieu of all other projects and issues. The erosion is a 
giving to the 40B applicant: his application has thrown municipal 
plans, programs, and reasonable goals and objectives to the wind. 
Finally, a discussion of takings and givings raises questions of pol-
icy. One approach is that taken by Massachusetts. To stimulate hous-
ing production, developers, speculators, or anyone else are granted a 
permit to produce as many dwelling units as can be engineered on a 
parcel of land, provided twenty-five percent of the units be sold or 
rented at below-market prices. Another approach is that taken by 
many other states. To stimulate housing production, cities and towns 
must develop realistic and measurable plans and programs to ensure 
that dwelling units are built in accordance with the plan. 
145 [d. 
146A pending question is whether the costs imposed by a comprehensive permit proj-
ect violate the prohibitions against "unfunded mandates," the so-called Proposition 2 lh tax 
cutting amendment enacted in 1981. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 27C (2000). There can 
be no doubt that the comprehensive permit project is "unfunded," There can be no doubt 
that the statutory scheme establi~hed by 40B is a "mandate," At issue is whether the re-
quirements imposed upon the State by the statute are triggered siuce 40B was enacted 
before chapter 29. See id. § 27C; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2000). 
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The policy question is not who should provide affordable hous-
ing. The answer to that question is clear that the private sector is the 
better provider. But the real question is, rather, how much control 
should be granted to the private sector in the pursuit of affordable 
housing development? The following discussion suggests that manda-
tory inclusionary zoning and/or impact fee requirements are appro-
priate and measured controls that ensure predictable development of 
affordable housing. 
IV. AN EQUITABLE AND PROVEN METHOD OF DEVELOPING 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING: INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
Given the controversy attendant with a statute that yields unpre-
dictable results, it would seem that a solution to the Massachusetts 
affordable housing problem that avoided such controversies would be 
embraced by all concerned. Inclusionary zoning, which requires resi-
dential developers to provide affordable honsing, represents one such 
solution.147 Mandatory inclusionary zoning, however, is not currently 
147 Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Illclusionwy Zoning: Successfully Creat-
ing Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 973 (2002) (stating that policymakers and 
citizens across the country promote indusionary zoning as a way to solve shortages of af-
fordable housing). An additional solution is the use of impact fees, one-time charges 
against new development to raise revenue for public facilities needed by the new develop-
ment. Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT 
FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING INfRASTRUCTURE IN THE 
DOLAN ERA 87 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995). Unfortunately, impact 
fees are not authorized in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with the exception of 
towns on Cape Cod. See, e.g., Emerson Coli. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1107 (Mass. 
1984) (holding that an augmented fire services availability charge was neither a valid mu-
nicipal users fee nor a valid excise tax and therefore did not conform to constitutionally-
permissible forms of monetary exaction); Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n v. TOWIl of 
Franklin, 730 N.E. 2d 900, 902 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (using the Emerson College analysis to 
find that a "school impact fee" was neither a permissible tax nor a valid municipal fee be-
cause it "failed to benefit fee payers in a manner not shared by other members of the 
community"). By virtue of the Cape Cod Commission Act, towns on Cape Cod that ha\'e a 
comprehensive plan, certified by the Cape Cod Commission, are enabled to impose im-
pact fees on new development. Cape Cod Commission Act of 1989 § 9(c), 1989 Mass. Acts 
716; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 4, The grant of authority to Cape Cod towns to impose 
impact fees (as well as enter into development agreements that would otherwise be 
deemed illegal contract zoning) coincides with the Cape Cod Commission Act's require-
ment of comprehensive plan development and consistency with the Regional Policy Plan 
for Cape Cod, Cape Cod Commission Act of 1989 § 9(c), 1989 Mass, Acts 716; see MASS. 
GEN, LAWS ch, 40B, § 4, Whereas towns are not required to prepare and have certified a 
comprehensive plan, nine of the fifteen towns have certified plans and the remaining sLx 
are presumed to have plans in place by the end of 2004, See generally EXACTIONS, IMPACT 
FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING INF'RAS'I~UC­
TURE IN 'IHE DOLAN ERA, supra (providing additional information on impact fees), 
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authorized in Massachusetts.148 Ironically, the same state that has pio-
neered a crude bludgeon to force cities and towns to "accept" afford-
able housing has prohibited those same cities and towns from devel-
oping affordable housing in a manner successfully used elsewhere. 
Common sense dictates that if inclusionary zoning were in existed in 
every suburban and rural community in the State, the placement of 
limitations on the use of restrictive zoning in the suburbs-the im-
plied purpose of the Comprehensive Permit Statute-would be un-
necessary.149 
The requirement that a developer of land or a petitioner for an 
adjudicative permit set aside land, money, or "things" is a traditional 
and common practice.t50 The validity of municipal exactions of land, 
money, or "things," as required by legislation and adjudicative per-
148 See Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics of Inclusionary lim-
ing Reclaimcd, 24 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 23,47-48 (2001) (asserting that Massachusetts has a 
form of voluntary inclusionary zoning). Section 9 of chapter 40A of the Massachusetts 
General Laws authorizes increases in density above that allowed by the underlying zoning 
upon the set aside, of among other things, affordable housing units. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
40A, § 9 (2000 & Supp. 2002). The limitation to this enabling authority is that a special 
(adjudicative) permit is required from a local board, thus increasing the odds that the 
local board will exact additional public benefits from the developer and decreasing the 
odds that the developer will be able to challenge the exaction upon appeal successfully. Scc 
id. Simply put, the special permit requirement creates an option that few developers will 
choose given the other option available to them-a comprehensive permit. MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23. As a result, inclusionary zoning in Massachusetts will never 
achieve successful results and, as long as the comprehensive permit option is available, is 
unlikely to be an option selected by a developer. 
149 Scc MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 2 ("The purpose of this chapter is to permit a city 
or town to plan jointly with cities or towns to promote with the greatest efficiency and 
economy the coordinated and orderly development of the areas within their jurisdiction 
and the general welfare and prosperity of their cities."). An easy solution to the affordable 
housing crisis, however, is not so attractive to some. The benefits attributed to the com-
prehensive permit developer are too good to be true. As discussed, in exchange for offer-
ing twenty-five percent of the units below market, he can develop land at unlimited densi-
ties. Scc supra Part III. He is not constrained by local rules and regulations. He can appeal 
to a state agency whose record of accomplishment ensures his success. His ·profit cap" is 
far greater than he would ever achieve developing market-rate dwellings (twenty percent 
of total development costs for a fee-based project and a ten percent annual rate of return 
for rental projects). Clever accounting practices avoid the need to worry about the cap. 
Gh'en all these benefits, why would the development community embrace inclusionary 
zoning, a process that makes the developer share in the community's burden? 
150 Sec APA GUIDEBOOK, sllpra note 28, §§ 8-601, 8-602, at 8-130 to -165 (listing various 
dedication. impact fee, and exaction requirements provided for in state statutes); Fred 
Bosselman, Dolan's Mystclics Explail/cd, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.,Jan. 1999, at 3. 
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mits, is well settled.l51 It should be no surprise, therefore, that cities 
and towns seeking to increase the number of dwelling units sold or 
rented at below market rates would be attracted to the time-tested 
practice of exactions-quid pro quos-in exchange for the grant of a 
development permit.152 
V. INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
Inclusionary zoning-the method of exacting on- or off-site 
dwelling units or fees-in-lieu-of the exaction-in exchange for subdivi-
sion approval, approval of an adjudicative permit, or a variance, is a 
logical tool for increasing the stock of below-market rate housing 
within a particular development or the community at large. 153 Inclu-
151 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 n.6 (Cal. 1996) (noting that, regard-
ing Nollan and Dolan, "[s]cholarly comment on the two cases is almost unmanageably 
large"). 
152 A study completed in 2002 concluded that over 50,000 affordable dwelling units 
had been created in California via inclusionary regulations. Kautz, supra note 141, at 979. 
The inclusionary-housing ordinance of Montgomery County, Maryland has produced 
almost 11,000 affordable dwelling units. KAREN D. BROWN, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON UR-
BAN METRO. POLICY, EXPANDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING THROUGH INCLUSlONARY ZONING: 
LESSONS FROM THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 2, 16 (2001) ("Many jurisdictions 
throughout the country have implemented inclusionary zoning ordinances, from Burling-
ton, Vt. to Santa Fe, N.M. to dozens of communities in California. Nationwide, Montgom-
ery County, Md. has been the most successful."); Cummins, supra note 9, at 216 ("If cities 
in the metro area [Minneapolis-St. Paul] were to adopt this approach [inclusionary zon-
ing], up to $15,000.00 per housing unit could be saved and nearly 40,000 affordable units 
could be built within twenty-five years."). 
153 Kent Conine, former vice president and current president of the National Associa-
tion of Homebuilders, while not overtly opposed to inclusionary zoning requirements, 
raises an interesting. question of equity: 
Do programs impose a cost, and if so, who bears that cost-the builder or the 
purchaser of the market rate homes? If there is a cost to the builder (eYen if 
only in more work or regulatory complications), is it fair for the builder to 
shoulder the cost of providing a needed social good? 
Kent Conine, A Home Builder's Policy View on Inclllsionary Zol/il/g, NEW CENTURY HOUSING 
(Ctr. for HollS. Pol'y, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2000, at 27. Of interest, is applying Mr. 
Conine's comments to the Massachusetts comprehensive permit statute. In that case, there 
is no cost to the builder for building affordable dwellings. Rather, as discussed previously, 
there is an unearned and unpaid for gift. Mr. Conine, and presumably most land develop-
ers, would argue that the cost should be born by the community at large and not by a pri-
vate developer alone. But it could reasonably be argued that the burden should not be 
born solely by those abutting a 40B development. In fact, that is the net result of the r-.1as-
sachusetts comprehensive permit statute. Those abutting the proposed project, individuals 
who could not have predicted the development's scale or impact, are left shouldering the 
burden of the legislature's mandate. In essence, the abutters to a 40B project are held 
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sionary zoning requirements are highly effective within rapidly grow-
ing suburban and rural communities, but can be tailored to work ef-
fectively in urban areas as well.154 
Inclusionary zoning has a proven track record of success and is 
particularly well-suited for adoption by Massachusetts cities and towns 
given the ad hoc adjudication that accompanies Massachusetts land 
use regulation. Inclusionary zoning requirements could exact afford-
able dwellings, lots, fees-in-lieu-of, or a combination of the three, 
within every new subdivision created throughout Massachusetts. 
Within a plan state's suburban and rural communities, inclusion-
ary zoning can ensure that the housing element and attendant goals 
are met by requiring that all new developments-residential and non-
residential-exact a percentage of dwelling units or fees-in-lieu-of 
dwelling units. A percentage exaction ensures that new development 
does not continually force the municipality below the target goal. For 
example, if the housing plan calls for no less than fifteen percent of 
the total housing stock to meet affordable criteria, an inclusionary 
regulation would need to ensure that no less than fifteen percent of 
the dwelling units within a new subdivision meet the established af-
fordability criteria.155 
Within a non-plan state, such as Massachusetts, inclusionary zon-
ing can also be effective, albeit less so than if the city or town had a 
comprehensive plan linking plan elements and regulations. The in-
clusionary requirement would be the same as in a plan state. The op-
tions include requiring the set-aside of land "on-site," set-aside of land 
accountable for their municipality's "failure" to achieve the 40B mandate of affordable 
housing. 
154 Others note that there are several other techniques that have proven useful in the 
creation oflow- and moderate-income housing units. Sec, e.g.,John M. Payne, Fairly Sliming 
AJJonlable Housing Obligations: Tile Mount Laurel Matrix, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 365, 374 
(2001) ("[I]ndusionary zoning is not an end in itself; it is only one example .... Consider 
some of the other market regulation techniques that might easily be required as part of a 
Mount Laurei compliance program: rent control laws, anti-gentrification laws, restrictions 
on condominium conversions, and zoning for 'mobile' homes."). 
155 This requirement points out yet another irony of the Massachusetts comprehensive 
permit statute. Not formally enabled to adopt indusionary zoning requirements, Massa-
chusetts cities and towns could hardly be expected to keep pace with the ten percent re-
quirement sufficient to keep an applicant from an entitlement to, and approval from, the 
HAC. Simply put, for every market-rate building permit issued in Massachusetts, the city or 
town falls one-tenth of a percentage point behind the Sisyphean quota. Perhaps it is no 
wonder that less than thirty of the State's 351 cities and towns have met this target in the 
thirty-four years since the statute was enacted. DEP'T OF Hous. AND COMMUNITY DEV., CH. 
40B SUBSIDIZED HOUSING INVENTORY ThROUGH OCTOBER 1. 2001 (revised Apr. 24, 2002), 
at http://www.state.ma.us/dhcd/ componen ts/hac/HsI1wRev.pdf. 
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"off-site," payment of fees in lieu of the set-aside, or a combination of 
the three,156 For example, a zoning ordinance could require that 
every subdivision plan containing five lots or more set one lot aside 
for sale to a moderate-income purchaser. In the alternative, the ordi-
nance could allow the applicant to pay the equivalent of the lot set-
aside requirementl57 into a fUlld established for the purposes of de-
veloping affordable housing. 
In urban and mostly developed cities and towns, inclusionary 
zoning requirements could exact affordable dwellings units or fees-in-
lieu-of instead of requiring the construction of dwelling unitsl58 as 
redevelopment or urban infill occurs. There are numerous examples 
of successful inclusionary zoning programs in the nation's urban cen-
ters. Although many of these programs are often referred to as "link-
age" or "impact fee" regulations, the end result-requiring the devel-
opment community to pay a fair-share cost for affordable housing-
remains the same.159 
156 See BROWN, supra note 152, at 2. 
157 An example of a fees-in-lieu-of provision drafted for the Town of Duxbury, Massa-
chusetts follows: 
The applicant for development ... may pay fees in lieu of the construction of 
affordable units .... [T) he fee in lieu of the construction or provision of af-
fordable units is determined to be $200,000 per unit. For example, if the ap-
plicant is required to construct two affordable income units, they may opt to 
pay $400,000 in lieu of constructing or providing the units. Unless and until 
adjusted by Town Meeting, the fee in lieu of the construction of affordable 
units shall increase three (3%) percent every twelve months .... 
DUXBURY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS art. 560.12(1) (2003) (draft). 
158 Although it is clear that adjudicatiye permitting is subject to judicial review based 
upon the tests enunciated in Nollan and Dolan, at issue is whether exactions such as fees-in-
lieu-of the set-aside of affordable dwelling units is also measured against the "nexus" and 
·proportionality" standards. The Supreme Court narrowed the applicability of Nollan and 
Dolan to instances where real property-and not money-is the subject of the exaction. See 
City of Monterey y. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,702-03 (1999); E. Enters. v. Ap-
fel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (Cal. 1996). A 
more conservative approach, however, is to assume that the nexus and proportionality tests 
apply to all exaction, including the acceptance of fees-in-lieu-of the set-aside of affordable 
dwelling units. 
159 Successful "urban" inclusionary zoning and linkage programs are numerous. See, 
e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 313 (2003) (requiring that commercial de-
velopers contribute land or money to a housing developer, or pay a fee to the city. to sub-
sidize housing development as a condition of the ·privilege" of development); SEATTLE, 
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 22.210 (2003) (providing relocation assistance to low-income 
tenants displaced by demolition, substantial rehabilitation, or change of use of residential 
rental property, or the removal of use restrictions from assisted housing developments). 
Boston's "linkage" program requires "the payment of a development exaction, or an 
equivalent in-kind contribution, for the creation of affordable hOllsing and project-related 
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CONCLUSION 
A statute that allows the private sector to demand a waiver of all 
locally adopted regulations for any land use-housing, agriculture, 
telecommunications, or wastewater treatment plants-is doomed to 
fail. That failure is due to the conflict between the broad grant of 
power from state to local governments and the State's subsequent re-
scission of this power for specified items. The conflict does not lie 
with the rescission itself, as the power to rescind is not being chal-
lenged. Rather, the illogic lies with mandating that cities and towns 
perform certain activities or meet specified quotas without enabling 
the city or town to do so on a comprehensive basis. Cities and towns 
face numerous and inextricably linked challenges, providing afford-
able housing is but one of them. 
The Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Statute, 40B, must be 
repealed or reformed. l60 Some aspects of the comprehensive permit 
statute could be left as is, if the locus that is subject to the application 
was identified in the city or town's comprehensive plan as a good can-
didate for an affordable housing development and was required to 
receive municipal approval before, rather than after, the issuance of 
financial support from a state or federal subsidizing agency. Similarly, 
the comprehensive permit process could be successfully used where 
local government approval is a condition precedent to the award of 
financial assistance or the issuance of a permit.161 Otherwise, the State 
must establish mandatory planning and consistency requirements, 
including the adoption of a housing element and the production of a 
specified percentage of low- and moderate-income housing. Cities 
and towns should be allowed to adopt mandatory inclusionary hous-
ing regulations, impact fees, and development agreements as they 
seek to accomplish the housing and other elements of their compre-
hensive plans. 
job training programs." CYNTIIIA M. BARR, BOSTON ZONING: A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK 93 
(1997). 
160 The statute has not been revised in thirty-four years. Repairs to the statute have 
been attempted through alterations to the governing administrative regulations. 
161 For example, the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment's (DHCD) Local Initiative Program requires that the chief elected official of the 
city or town approve a comprehensive permit project before any review and approval by 
DHCD. LOCAL INITIATIVE PROGAM, MASS. DEP'T OF Hous. AND CMTY. DEV., LOCAL INI-
TIATIVE PROGRAM FACT SHEET, at http://www.state.ma.us/dhcd/publicationslfaccsheets/ 
lip.pdf (last visited Feb. 2. 2003). The local government approval is the ·subsidy" that al-
lows the project to move forward. See MASS REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 45.04 (2002) (explaining 
the requirements for a valid Comprehensive Permit Project). 
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In summary, a solution to the affordable housing crisis in Massa-
chusetts requires the following: 
First, Massachusetts must establish mandatory planning and regu-
latory consistency requirements162 similar to those adopted in Cali-
fornia163 and Rhode Island.164 
Second, it must articulate a statewide housing plan. The default 
plan in place is the requirement that every city or town have ten per-
cen t of its housing stock subsidized. This plan, as thirty-four years of 
history has shown, has failed. The State needs a true plan, not an arbi-
trarily arrived at quota. 
Third, cities and towns should be given a time frame within 
which measurable progress toward achieving the state, regional, or 
municipal housing goals can be met. This time frame should be estab-
lished as part of the housing element165 within the comprehensive 
plan. 
162 Massachusetts must unfortunately solve additional problems, such as the reforma-
tion of the State's zoning and subdivision regulations. Portions of the Zoning Act have 
been referred to by the Massachusetts Appeals Court as "infelicitous." Fitzsimonds v. Bd. of 
Appeals of Chatham, 484 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); see l\fAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 
40A, § 9 (2000). The American Planning Association has also referred to the Massachusetts 
regulatory program as "confusing, outdated and restrictive." FINUCAN ET AL., supra note 
13, at 71. 
163 California law requires that the comprehensive plan's housing element contain 
programs to develop new affordable housing, preserve existing affordable housing stock, 
and identify locations for emergency shelters for the homeless. 
164 The Rhode Island Low and Moderate Income Housing Act of 1956 was modeled af-
ter the Massachusetts comprehensive permit law. Rhode Island Low and Moderate Income 
Housing Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-1 (1999 & Supp. 2003). The Act provides for an ap-
peal to a state administrative agency (the State Housing Appeals Committee). Id. § 45-53-5. 
It also requires Rhode Island cities and towns to have ten percent of their housing stock 
subsidized. Id. § 45-53-3(2) (ii). A key distinction, however, is that Rhode Island is a plan 
state and a housing element is a required component of a city's or town's comprehensive 
plan. Id.; Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 45-22.2-3 (a) (4) ("Comprehensive planning and its implementation will promote the 
appropriate use of land. The lack of comprehensive planning and its implementation has 
led to the misuse, underuse and overuse of our land and natural resources."). Precisely 
because Rhode Island is a plan state and cities and towns have adopted comprehensive 
plans to address affordable housing (recall that the Rhode Island requirements are other-
wise the same as, and no less punitive than, Massachusetts's), the Low and Moderate In-
come Housing Act defines "consistent with local needs" as the existence of ten percent 
subsidized housing or the existence of a housing element within a comprehensive plan 
that will enable the development of subsidized housing in excess of ten percent. R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 45-53-3(2). Thus, cities or towns that have adopted a comprehensive plan and 
regulations in accordance with the plan that support the development of affordable hous-
ing are deemed to have satisfied the state goal. Id. § 45-53-3. 
165 As of the writing of this Article, the Department of Housing and Community De-
velopment has been charged with drafting guidelines for the preparation of a housing 
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Fourth, municipalities must be provided with appropriate ena-
bling authority to exact impact fees, adopt mandatory inclusionary 
zoning regulations, and enter into development agreements in the 
fulfillment of their housing and other planning goals.166 
Finally, if municipalities fail to achieve the mandated goals as es-
tablished by the statewide plan and/or the goals established by the 
local comprehensive plan, then, and only then, should there be an 
option for abdication of local zoning regulations or appeals to an ad-
ministrative agency with the power to reverse the local presumption of 
validity. 
plan to achieve compliance with Massachusetts regulations. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, 
§ 31.0 (2003). But as discussed throughout this article, achieving compliance with one 
statutory requirement does not ensure that other requirements or needs will be addressed 
in a coordinated fashion. Notwithstanding a municipality's desire to comply with DHCD's 
guidelines until the statute is reformed, this Article suggests that a successful recipe for the 
housing elemen t of a comprehensive plan consist of the following steps: (I) an analysis of 
the city or town's existing housing supply including determining the number and type of 
housing units, the occupancy of these units, and the cost to purchase or rent these units; 
(2) an analysis of the housing demand within the city or town;(3) an analysis of the city or 
town's housing need. The need for affordable housing is generally determined using one 
of two approaches. First, goals consistent with the municipality's comprehensive plan 
should be adopted. Second, the implementation of the housing element of a comprehen-
sh'e plan requires adoption of regulatory and non-regulatory tools. The list of regulatory 
tools include inclusionary zoning; impact fees; development agreements; rezoning to ac-
commodate multifamily development or greater density; adjudicative permit options; and 
use of the waiver provisions of the Subdivision Control Law to exact public benefits such as 
affordable housing. l\IASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 8IR (2000). Each of the above-noted tools 
is adopted, however, in concert ,..,ith a comprehensive plan. 
166 Sec Brad K. Schwartz, Note, Developmcnt il.grccmcnts: Contracting for H:stcd Rights, 28 
R.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 719, 732-33 (2000). 

